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Economic, social and cultural rights and development strategies: human rights economics in international relations

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Development Strategies: Human Rights Economics in International Relations

Background Paper

Alfredo Sfeir-Younis*

An Overview

A Global Consensus. Never in the history of economic and social progress have we experienced such a convergence regarding the content and scope of development goals and strategies. There seems to be a unanimous consensus, for example, that we need to eliminate absolute poverty; stop the degradation of our human and natural environment; make all possible efforts in the direction of sustainable peace (domestic and international); live in crime-free societies; establish the strongest foundation into the design of our long-term future (intergenerational equity); eliminate racism, discrimination and many other social bads; and many more. No doubt that the identification, respect and implementation of all forms of rights are at the core of all the above.

It is difficult to find a platform of a political party, or the main elements of a national development strategy, or the mandate of a given development institution (national or international) that does not contain some of the above mentioned elements. It is unimaginable to conceive any stakeholder in development who is not concerned with the negative dimensions of poverty and who is not somehow engaged into addressing one of more aspects of this problem.

Proliferation of Development Strategies. But it is also true that there is a huge proliferation of development strategies at the local, national, regional and global levels. The differences between these - both in terms of nature and scope and in terms of quality - are immense. This proliferation is marked and led by a number of interest groups, including civil society groups (NGOs as an example), business sector, governments, international development institutions, bi-lateral donors and so on. At times it seems that these strategies are more set in search of resources than in establishing the solid foundation that would improve the welfare of those for whom the strategy is intended in the first place. Be as it may, in most cases, a distinction must be made between development strategies elaborated at the national (domestic) level and those framed at the international and global level. Also, it is important to note that it is the ministers of planning and development (plus economics and finance) who are at the centre of these strategies and their elaboration. Many others are often absent, unless they provide a chapter on the matter of their narrow interest.

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This institutional reality imposes a very unique pattern design and reflection over the main theme of this seminar, which focuses on the true legitimacy, and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. A subject matter to which this paper comes back later on.

New Understanding of Development. Nevertheless it is essential to point out that it is also true that there is a "new" understanding of what socio-economic development is all about. And the fact that one of the recent Nobel Winners is indeed Mr. Amartya Sen, says a lot and it has become one strong proof that this is the case. Similarly, the whole movement towards people's participation (listening to people) - enhancing empowerment, stakeholders' ownership of the development process, and establishing new forms of governance - are a few examples of what the corresponding new institutional framework looks like today. While the importance of economics and finance cannot be discounted - including the market and non-market mechanisms that go with economic and financial practices - it is evident that development goes far beyond their confines. The social, political, human, moral, ethical, legal and cultural dimensions are all part and parcel of today's debate. This has enriched the formulation of development strategies but, at the same time, it has created new forms of complexity in consensus building and implementation. While nobody questions the importance of culture in the attainment of sustainable development - i.e., a society can only attain sustainability if it reaches cultural sustainability - a way to put this in practice is not self evident. The trade offs between all these goals, the fact that resources are limited and the reality imposed by social and power structures make development a complex field of inquiry.

Therefore, neither is poverty defined just in terms of money income nor is development focusing simply on the physical needs of beneficiaries. But capturing many of the complexities and assessing obvious trade-offs are the major challenges today.

Some Important Dimensions

Human Development, Human Rights and Legal Rights. Furthermore, it seems essential to note the fact that many development practitioners involved in the design and implementation of development strategies do not make the proper distinction between human development (and processes), human rights, and legal rights. It is essential that this distinction is made if one is ever to assess and judge how well the development strategies fit within the goodness of fit of development strategies in relation to the whole body of economic, social and cultural rights. And, this is not just semantics.

Common to all three is an understanding that human beings are at the centre of any development process. While familiar and rather obvious for some people, this dimension still must be made explicit and to a major extent enforced. Without getting too much into cumbersome definitions and connotations – totally beyond the scope of this paper — one can illustrate the differences of the above mentioned interconnected themes by saying that while human development is mainly involved in enhancing the capabilities and enabling the environment for people to participate and benefit from development, the human right approach establishes the grounds for claims, duties, responsibilities, and accountability in the multiple dimensions of the development process. No doubt that there are a number of critics and constraints associated with the latter, including important disagreements on the foundations of

rights, importance of cultural relativism, the fact that many rights are vaguely defined, no clarity on responsibility and accountability, excessive advocacy with little rigor, and the like.

On the other hand, legal rights are much easier to define as they are subject to clear enforcement and legal actions. But it is up to the political and legal framework of each country to define the content and scope of rights and concordance actions, assessments and remedies.

In many of the development strategies - both at the country and at the global levels - rights are really very vaguely defined. In most cases the situation is one of defining, or stating the main principles of development and progress where a society wants to be. These principles may be extremely close to the debate on true rights as it is social justice, equity, participation, benefiting from government policies and public expenditure patterns, having access to a basic development compact (like education, health, housing and food), alternative forms of empowerment, adopting new forms of governance, enunciating responsibilities, and the like. All of these principles have a corresponding image into alternative forms and dimensions of human rights.

Operational Dimensions. Making human rights operational is the ultimate task. Development strategies have the added advantage that they transform the operational expression of principles, goals and elements of the strategy into programs and projects. This is the **operational dimension** of the development strategy. From the perspective of international development institutions (including all the UN and specialized agencies, and the Bretton Woods Institutions), this operational dimension has important connotations that are directly related to their respective mandates. The fundamentals of these mandates are extremely important as it brings in a multi-faceted and a pluralistic way the needed development assistance for nation states to implement as they see it fit and as they feel their own accountability for all or any of the covenants linked to economic, social and cultural rights.

In the case of the World Bank, there is a major history of assisting countries in the implementation of those rights. This is also the case of most international organizations. What part of the agenda one ends up addressing depends on country priorities, the ideology of development at any given point in time, and the resources in the hands of those most in need. Thus, during the era of reconstruction, major infrastructure projects paved the way to the implementation of many human rights and the right to development. Then, specific programs tailored for the poor – like rural development and the provision of low cost public services (e.g., water and sanitation) and urban development – brought other unique aspects of the development process at the service of compliance with human rights. And important part of the enabling environment referred to earlier is directly linked to the management of the economy at the macro level. Employment and public expenditure policies are examples of where macroeconomic management may create close spaces for the implementation of rights in a given society.

While many more efforts are needed at the sector level, it is eminently clear that major progress has been attained in areas such as education, health, food security, housing, nutrition, sanitation, water and many others. However, there are still too many people who have not been able to benefit and also exercise those rights and, therefore, more comprehensive and effective efforts are needed. Thus, social rights are in some ways being addressed by most development strategies.

Recently, significant efforts have been devoted to create the political and institutional spaces for the implementation of cultural rights. There are many international organizations that have taken the lead in this area for over a century of concerted and committed work programs. One example is that of rights of indigenous peoples, culture and sustainable development, and so many others. Furthermore, the work that has been made in the area of cultural heritage is particularly significant. NGOs have been leaders in these areas for quite a long time.

The Institutional Dimensions. Perhaps the weakest link in development strategies and the corresponding implementation of existing economic, social and cultural rights rests in the weakness of domestic and global institutions. Thus, it is imperative to identify comprehensive efforts geared to strengthen the **institutional dimensions** of the development process. These institutional dimensions do not only include needed organizational arrangements, but also the definition of roles and functions of stakeholders (government, people, private sector, NGOs...), laws/rules/regulations, information and knowledge transfer, and many other aspects.

Human rights must be anchored into congruent and symmetric institutional arrangements. However, what is important to note is that these arrangements vary according to many different factors and, therefore, institutions to implement cultural rights are rather different from those to enforce and implement economic rights. Experience demonstrates that institutions to address an important set of cultural rights seem to be far behind in relation to institutions to address economic and social rights. But, perhaps more importantly, the "rules of the game" (institutional arrangements) defining the real prospects for progress in the rights front are much less developed and are rather different in the area of cultural rights than they are in other forms of rights. Thus, in some cases, economic rights are pursued through significant market mechanisms that do not necessarily respect the existence of a number of cultural rights.

The Policy Dimensions. No development strategy is void of policy content, but many of them make no effort to link these policies with human right considerations. And, this is perhaps where and why the debate on economic rights is rather inconclusive. In some cases the **policy dimensions** are obscured by immediate issues and concerns so the more longer term decisions take the back seat. Given that the implementation of rights is an effort with major long-term connotations, this is an area that deserves special attention.

A special feature of the debate on policies and human rights has to do with the so-called separability problem; i.e., our inability to clearly separate the cause-effect relationships that exist between one or more policies and the attainment of economic, social and cultural rights. This problem has led to a difficult dialogue between policy makers and planners and those who are establishing the grounds for human rights and economic development related actions. As a result, we either end up linking every possible policy to the violation of human rights or the right to development; or creating a major void in both dialogue and action. The discussions on debt, structural adjustment and public expenditures do illustrate this point.

In addition, experience demonstrates that the policy arguments in favour of attaining a set of rights - be it economic, social or cultural rights - are not symmetric or capable to apply in both directions of the argument. This is the case of debt servicing and public expenditures in education and health, for example; while it may be true that servicing the debt may be the cause

in the decline of those expenditures, nothing assures that once the debt is paid, the country will maintain a higher level of public expenditures.

Finally, it is worth noting that there are some differences between the policy content on a given theme at the level of a country and that of international institutions. As it has been shown in some cases related to the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities, the policy prescriptions of international development institutions may be more stringent than those of the countries themselves.

The Case of Poverty Eradication

Would poverty eradication in itself ensure the implementation of all economic, social and cultural rights? The answer is certainly not. However, it is clear that living in absolute poverty most human rights are being violated and that the efforts to alleviate poverty are of paramount importance. This is one of the reasons why most development strategies at the national and the global levels are focusing on the existing poverty issue and its social and cultural ramifications.

Many development institutions, including the World Bank see poverty as the central part of the mandate, and the understanding about poverty has been changing at a rapid rate. This can be seen in many different ways, including a comparative analysis of the World Development Reports (WDR) of the year 1990 and 2000/1 published by the Bank. While the material aspects of poverty permeate every corner of the WDR 1990 (e.g., income, growth), the latest WDR acknowledges new dimensions of a comprehensive poverty eradication strategy. This is conceived at three main levels: opportunities, empowerment and security. In all these cases, the non-material dimensions influencing the level of poverty in any given situation are of significant importance.

The United Nations Sponsored Conferences. There is no doubt that the recent UN Conferences have clearly enhanced the debate on poverty and have added a number of key dimensions like population, gender equality and environmental sustainability. In all of these conferences there are agreed plans of actions, all of which contain important elements of the human rights equation. In particular, the Social Summit has repeatedly stated a number of key economic, social and cultural rights, and it is within the context of these principles that some action could take place now.

International Development Goals. One of the main results linked to the Conferences is the establishment of the International Development Goals (IDGs), touching on a large number of human rights related themes. It is here where international development institutions have been and will continue to be playing an important role. But this role will only enhance the situation in a given country if country ownership is at the centre of the process. It is this ownership that will give body to a process that is rights-based and that will ultimately generate the coherence needed at the operational, institutional and policy levels. Furthermore, last year during the Millennium Assembly the UN has again brought about extremely concrete programs of actions and possible avenues to have societies where social justice and human rights are attained. This declaration was signed by nearly 200 Heads of State and it constitutes a mandate nobody can ignore.

The Missing Links

But there is a number of missing links, and this is not surprising given the complexity of the problems in question. One of them is related to the participation of different Ministries in the design and implementation of development strategies. This is essential in the case of mainstreaming human rights into economic management and implementation. For the time being many Ministries remain completely separated from a process which is essential to some of their mandates. Given the fact that human rights and the solutions to the problems associated to those rights are multidimensional in nature, solutions demand a pluralistic and multi-institutional approach to mainstreaming.

This is easier said than done, as many of the manifestations related to the main theme of this paper and the seminar are linked to the same syndrome. Inter-ministerial relationship also reflects power relationships that are not easy to change from one day to the other. For a long time matters of human rights were conceived as simply political and thus of the domain of those ministries concerned. Now, with the notion of economic, social and cultural rights as well as of the right to development, the whole institutional relationship must be subject to question.

Another important consideration is that international institutions cannot go beyond the development framework and institutions the society in question wants to promote. The legal and institutional framework being key aspects of this debate. This is not the first time this issue is being raised but it cannot be expected that either pressure or conditionality would resolve the constraints that already exist in the countries in question. There are institutional limits and it is essential that sovereignty and ownership are not violated in the process.

Furthermore, it is essential to avoid that international organizations become world governments or world police forces. The time of colonialism is over and no agency should take those roles. Certainly the international financial and economic institutions are the least equipped and suitable to perform this type of function. The process cannot just stay at the advocacy level because such pressure will completely politicize the process and clearly countries will attain poor outcomes.

The same applies to the advocacy role, understood simply in political terms. This role has been empowered to a specific institution, The High Commissioner's Office, and it should be respected and protected. The role of development and financial institutions must focus on specific aspects of economic, social and financial policies.

A major problem is in the area of global public goods and in the assignments of rights over those goods. At present there is no development institution that is fully in charge. Furthermore, even the best development strategies at the national level will not be effective or even relevant (in many cases) to address a large number of issues of global public goods' nature. In sum, there is a major problem with the existing global governance structures. Structures that must include more than governments; e.g., the inclusion of NGOs, organized civil society, private sector and other stakeholders. This is a major challenge.

Finally, it is important to note that at the level of "intentions" there is all the will of the world to address issues of human rights and economic development. However, as agencies or

groups in society move into implementation there are major breakdowns. These are the main cause for the violation of rights at many levels. Thus, it is extremely critical that we focus on the reasons for this breakdown and try to resolve it. In many international meetings, it has been said that such a breakdown is mainly due to the lower level of human and social coherence or awareness. A situation where elements just become the residual of a number of actions that do not amount to the social optimum everyone is trying to attain.

In part, this breakdown will be minimized as a result of a major change in our value system. Societies must embrace value systems that are human right inclusive, at all levels of decision-making, including economic and financial decision-making. For the time being there is a major contradiction in values and thus the results are mixed and limited at best.

Creating Wealth: The Human Rights of Economics or The Economics of Human Rights

Wealth Creation. Given the nature of development strategies and of many of the international financial institutions, it is essential to look into the relationship between economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development (RTD) - either as a concept or as a new paradigm - and the whole process of **wealth creation.** It would be essential to focus on and give major emphasis to the possible implications for developing countries. This is a process that is influenced as much by external factors as it is by internal factors.

The Link To Capital Accumulation. The point of departure of this effort must be simple: countries seem to agree with the need to mainstream the human rights and the RTD into economic and social development, and this is one of the functions to be performed by a development strategy. Thus the importance of linking the RTD to the process of wealth creation. Otherwise, the whole theme will remain separate and dissociated from economic decision making in all countries. In most countries and development institutions, this effort is far from complete, and it has not been easy to address. One of the points of departure has been to use the experience gained in the intellectual journey when the concept of sustainable development and wealth creation were linked. In some respect, this is a similar exercise. In the case of sustainability, the political economy of the debate identified at least three of its dimensions - social, environmental and economic. And, having identified these three dimensions lots of time was devoted to linking them to the process of wealth creation. This was done through associating the economic, social and environmental dimensions to the theory of growth and capital accumulation.

Once this was properly done, most of the debate moved into another aspect of sustainability: its equity implications over both space and time. Poverty being at the centre of the debate obliged development strategies to make explicit the links that such poverty had with sustainable development. And, as seen during the last few years, a large number of articles, books and reports on the different aspects of poverty and sustainable development have been published. This has not been an easy matter to address and needless to say some of these aspects still remain unsettled.

The Right To Development. In the same context, it has become imperative to link the RTD to the process of wealth creation. The first step demands to focus on the question of "Where does the right to development fit within the process of capital accumulation?" with capital accumulation as the principal source of wealth creation. Based on established research, it has been founded that wealth creation is a function principally of accumulated capital in at least six forms: physical, financial, human, natural, institutional and cultural. It is the accumulation of one or more of these forms of capital that is ultimately responsible for wealth creation.

It is in this respect that policy makers must understand the RTD as a major "organizing principle" and a practice (i.e., the process) through which societies apply the assignment of rights over the existing productive assets. This organizing principle is country specific in order to respond to the values, belief system and cultural patterns agreed in each society, wherever an assignment of rights takes place.

- It is here and within this context that the whole debate on entitlements and the right to a process can be integrated into the debate on development and policy formulation.

- It is here where the debate on income and non-income gaps in any society begins to take a new meaning.

- It is here where the issue of private and public entitlement of rights needs to be integrated.

Capital Accumulation and Poverty. The income dimensions of poverty are not enough to explain the relationship between rights, capital accumulation and policy making. One dimension of critical importance is that of defining poverty as an "inability to accumulate capital" in its several forms. And such inability to accumulate capital is essential to understand the so-called pro-poor-growth, and the process of creation of wealth as well as the process of fulfilment of all rights, including the RTD. This concept is very similar to the idea brought by the debate on "capacity dimension".

This is an area that offers a great deal of potential in the formulation of instruments to combat and eradicate poverty. Going beyond the traditional ways of addressing poverty - as income poverty - an ability of capacity analysis puts a renewed emphasis on institutional, cultural, organizational, and equity dimensions of the development process. We know that the ability has been impaired by not having access to the productive assets of the economy, be it land, water or other natural resources, or be it other productive assets that remain in the hands of a few.

This is an area where much more debate should take place as it elucidates a number of issues that remain too general and not well attended in the debate we have had to date.

Implications for Governance and Institutions. But a debate on wealth creation and poverty eradication must be anchored into congruent or symmetric governance structures and institutions. In this case, governance must not be understood just as the "rules of the game" or the "rules of engagement" but, in addition, as the accumulated principles behind a process that would lead to the full expression of the RTD (i.e., its wisdom).

One should also note, that each possible combination of rights - private rights, public rights, collective rights, common rights, and many more forms of rights - materializes and maps into some unique form of institutions and/or governance structures. These may be referring to local, national, regional or global structures. Thus, for example, the best management of existing global public goods will demand the assignment of global rights as well as a corresponding form(s) of governance that will prove to be very different from the one needed to assign rights to locally managed and used assets.

The linking between the right to development and the process of wealth creation opens new doors for setting creative boundaries to the different policy dialogues taking place today. It will be through these dialogues that alternative forms of institutions will have to be created and implemented.

Human Rights Principles and Economic Principles. In most human rights declarations the notion of someone in a group being better off in relationship to human rights is often defined as "a society will only be better off if one or all elements of the vector improve without one or any becoming worse off". In economics, this criterion is called a "Strict Pareto Improvement". This is to say a situation where one or more people get better off without anyone getting worse off. Such a principle disregards a series of other "compensation formulas" where in some instances someone can be worse off.

Thus, one will have to be aware that economic principles do not always follow the rule suggested by some of the agreements, and this principle may end up being violated on economic grounds, while economists would advocate that, overall, society is better off. This is the case where it is stated that the advocated principle is one whereby the very explicit: "violation of any right implies a violation to the RTD".

The Political Economy of Human Rights

But economics is not all that counts on the road to implementing economic, social and cultural rights. In fact, the political economy of the issues is much more fundamental. Part of the reason is the fact that most rights issues are political in nature, and another reason has to do with the very complex nature of the themes involved. Let me illustrate it by outlining some of these themes.

Equity. First, on human rights and equity we are here today because of major violations of rights and the distorted distributional patterns in their realization. And, there is no development strategy that does not make strong reference to one or more equity issues and concerns. These equity and distributional concerns are often determined and linked to the ownership of productive assets in the economy (including natural resources and environmental goods and services), disparities in income levels, spatial (upstream and downstream relationships) and inter-temporal distortions in accessibility and quality. In many cases the solutions, or the rules to follow, are not trivial. But what is certain is that countries need a major political consensus to make progress. I would like to emphasize the importance of addressing intergenerational equity and distributional issues that play a central role in any sustainable development strategy. There is an important question we all need to attend: How do institutions

and governments mainstream these human rights and equity concerns into their projects, programs and policies?

Empowerment. Any materialization of rights means significant shifts in empowerment. Between one group and another group in society – particularly between those in power and those without it! - between this generation and future generations, between the rich and the poor, and so on. This may also include alternative forms of empowerment among different groups in a society or among different organizations.

Assignment or enforcement of rights (of any of them) by definition means creating new forms of empowerment, and empowerment of people and organizations creates deep political and cultural demands for change. Thus, to empower the poor and give them access to high quality/productive assets is not a trivial proposition for many societies. Empowering women and the youth is also problematic for many countries. And, the lack of it has been the main source of social conflict and instability. Balancing or shifting power is often accompanied by enormous resistance, particularly in those countries where class structures, cast systems, and some ingrained cultural beliefs are not always ready for drastic change.

Governance. But even in cases where societies have decided to address the equity and empowerment related issues resulting from the need to realize a number of human rights, these cannot be conceived in a vacuum. An essential ingredient is that of governance (the rules of the game, the rules of engagement, the rules of decision making, the wisdom of policy making). A major problem facing many countries today is the lack of adequate governance structures. In fact, there is a crisis of confidence in most types of governance structures. This has resulted in a constant move of the pendulum from one extreme to the other – like from the public to the private sectors – without creating the foundations for governance structures that are capable of mainstreaming rights to health in economic development. National development strategies are weak in this respect. And, global development strategies remain handicapped because of the lack of global governance structures.

Little research has been carried out to look into the correspondence between alternative forms of governance and the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. And it is perfectly possible to think of a situation where there may be contradictions among alternative forms of governance and the assignment or implementation of these rights separately. The governance structure that might effectively deliver on the economic front (using the market mechanisms, for example) may run counter to those forms of governance needed to attain cultural or social rights. In addition, just think about the possible alternative ways to manage productive assets that are in common or collectively vis-à-vis the pressure to assign private rights. A complex matrix of options and priorities, without well established governance structures.

Institutions. The issues of governance lead to questions of institutional capacity in developing countries. In practice, the implementation of all human rights and the right to development (policies and programs) is confronted with extremely weak rules of the game, including justice systems, particularly as it relates to the poor, powerless and minorities. And, this is not only the domain of legal structures in a country, as the debate on rights has opened new doors for added responsibilities by all Ministries, Parliaments, Unions and other

organizations. The debate on human rights has become the affair of all organizations and this represents a very new dimension in decision-making. Thus, an inefficient Ministry of health, for example, may be as condemning of a violation of the rights of indigenous minorities as are the inefficiencies of the Ministries of economy and justice. Given the bad experience with capacity building and institutional development, the theme of today will remain a major cliffhanger for any discussion on mainstreaming.

Affordability. It is clear that any development strategy makes the point that economics and finance do matter. More specifically, all of these strategies bring to the forefront a debate on affordability, and this debate is central to others such as the one on mainstreaming, universality in the application of rights and many more. It is clear that focusing on affordability, and who actually pays for the materialization of rights raises many intricate political, economic and ethical dilemmas. For example, there are some who claim that everyone needs to have access to a minimum level of education, health or ecological welfare independently of the beneficiary's level of income.

There is a lot of confusion regarding the pricing of these services and the crucial role of well-established cost recovery policies. Otherwise, mainstreaming will be short lived.

Attention to affordability, under conditions of inadequate resources will bring decision-makers to address major trade-offs, some of which are not that easy to settle. For example, in most cases it is not trivial how one decides between one dollar allocated to primary education vis-à-vis the same dollar allocated to basic food security. These trade-offs are seldom debated in development strategies. Many of the parameters responsible of sectoral allocations are rather implicit.

Participation (Representation). A real sustainable society can only be constructed with an active participation of all the development stakeholders. While this may sound trivial to many **in** this audience, participation has not been uniform and equal across income groups or social strata in most countries. This includes the industrialized countries as well. There are few countries where the poor people participate fully in the definition and vision of their own destiny, as encapsulated by the development strategy. Also, it is important to note that participation is not cost free. In some cases, participation may be extremely costly due to the lack of infrastructure, communication systems, and the like.

The Sustainability of the Development Effort. Most actions must be conceived as long-term interventions. Experience demonstrates that short-term palliatives will simply not do and, thus, the respect for human rights now does not ensure the same for the future. In many development strategies, a long-term view of the development process is absent, as the planning system often has to respond – or has the capacity to respond - only to immediate challenges and demands.

To change the situation, it would require focusing on different types of action plans and programs. Central to this is the fact that countries will have to take their destiny in their own hands: ownership and identity are fundamental. This is why, political and social spaces are needed to consolidate country ownership and identity in development. These will be essential in

mainstreaming; as without this foundation the goals of a human right-based development would be impossible to attain.

Mainstreaming and Targeting The Poor. Mainstreaming also means targeting populations that have not been able to live in acceptable social and natural environments. Mainstreaming means effective inclusion. And this challenge of inclusion must be central to this debate. But, inclusion is not a trivial proposition. Experience with many social programs demonstrates that actually reaching the target populations is a very difficult task. The same happens when a number of safety nets are implemented which, in the end, benefit lots of people outside the target group. Reaching the target population is the key acid test of mainstreaming.

Existing Value Systems. In the end, the only way for a society to respect and mainstream sustainability concerns in all its dimensions, is to embrace a value system that starts from a human-right-value-based. And these must be put within a human value and "people's first approach", to attain the goals they themselves bring to the development process. Juts adding the theme of human rights (just a chapter) to an existing, and biased value system, does not ensure that people will benefit from approaching their goals. For those who advocate human rights as the entrance point of development planning and implementation must know that groups in society violate principles of a human rights based society because development is guided by another set of values and belief system. Specifically, we know that in most cases an economic value system is exclusive rather than inclusive; a process of exclusion that materializes through purchasing power. Mainstreaming human rights demands a value system where these are not the residual of other values and belief systems. But, rather, an integral part of it. This demands a major cultural shift or a return to many societies' original human values. It is in this context that attention to opportunities, empowerment and vulnerability must be fully taken into account.

Social Contracts. Mainstreaming economic, social and cultural rights is like drawing up a new "social contract". Many development strategies propose new avenues, instruments and policies without questioning the existing social contract, or purposely maintaining the existing set of social relationships. But if changes are to come, societies will have to draw new social contracts. However, the time that it will take to agree on them may be long enough that the process, itself, becomes the self-defeat of mainstreaming.

Styles of Development. Mainstreaming will remain a theoretical proposition where a style of development is biased against the respect and implementation of human rights. There are styles of development that are more egalitarian than others; that are more inclusive than others; and that care about the needy more than others. These biases cannot be ignored. And, in most cases, mainstreaming may be challenging the prevailing development paradigm.

Individual and Collective Actions. Mainstreaming requires that one embraces both individual and collective actions. It appears that the future of mainstreaming may rest quite a lot more on collective actions. As mentioned earlier, this is particularly the case of public goods generated at the national, regional and global level. The spread of HIV/AIDS demonstrates the example of a public bad that needs to be urgently addressed.

But in mainstreaming major collective action is needed at all levels. There is little or no research on how these actions affect mainstreaming activities.

Our Vision of the Future. Mainstreaming has to be conceived and implemented within an agreed vision of our future. The vision for the country and the Planet in which we live. Without this vision, mainstreaming will have no identity and no direction. The vision will be the compass that will direct all our efforts in making sure that all the rights are respected and complied with. This vision may demand new and more profound notions of what economic progress and human welfare are all about and what these imply. This vision may need to go to the roots of what life is all about in its material and non-material dimensions.

It is this vision that will provide the true normative character to mainstreaming sustainability into development: defining rights and responsibilities and embracing economic, social, cultural, ethical, moral and spiritual values.

Leadership. Even if all the above elements sound relevant, there is nothing that replaces good and effective leadership. Mainstreaming will take a lot of good and trusted leadership. For the time being leadership has rested in an advocacy corner, but it cannot remain there. And, this leadership needs to be holistic and inclusive.

Some Important Lessons

For any development institution to start a truly serious policy dialogue at the country level on the economics of human rights and its relationship to development strategies - including its implications for economic policy making and program design and implementation - it would require a number of important and necessary elements:

- It would require a formal request from the country in question to bring the essence of the human rights elements into the debate and, based on such a dialogue, begin to challenge the approach to and actual allocations of development assistance. We believe that this may be done through the existing process embodied in the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), where country ownership is one of its pillars.

- It would require a great deal more clarity of the possible impacts that such a dialogue may have. It is a concern how do countries see the real boundaries of a comprehensive process of mainstreaming economic, social and cultural rights and the RTD into economic and financial practices established to date. International development institutions need very practical, concise and rigorous guidelines, all widely accepted and ready to be implemented. These guidelines must account for the importance of macroeconomic management.

Some key strategic concerns regarding the links to the right to development are worth noting.

One, on value systems. The Bank has stated during several occasions that the RTD embodies a new value system and that a lot needs to be said about the nature and scope of such system. Examples of these values are: equity, transparency, accountability, decentralized development, justice, freedom of information, participation, (meaningful participation), non-discrimination, and the like. This is a matter that we cannot leave unattended. The RTD is a

new system of values, and all institutions of any society must promote these values. Thus, it is not just a matter of more education, or greater coverage, or benefiting minorities, but a matter of what values permeate the education systems we want to promote. The same applies to health, right to food, and housing, just to name the few.

Two, on the right to a process. We believe this is one of the most salient contributions of the present debate on RTD. One remaining issue is that of establishing very clearly the fundamentals of this process. In an operational terms this would be easier to define than just stating that such a process should also be rights based. This links to our previous point (on value systems), but also calls for a major recognition of the "initial conditions" of that process. Examples of initial conditions refer to who owns existing productive assets, in whose hands these assets are located, and so on. When these initial conditions are not even close to a 'justice society', the process will become more complex and the stakes will be rather high. The larger the ownership gaps the more difficult it will be to have the right to that process or ensure that the process is respecting all forms of rights. This brings us to a complementary point we made earlier: that of the role that styles of development play in attaining the key goals and objectives behind the implementation of the RTD. There are systems that are biased against human rights, and we need to focus on the conditions and elements that are built in these styles of development. Otherwise, one may end up increasing inequalities and injustices, even if some form of universal access has been put in place.

Finally, on the responsibility for the implementation of rights. The responsibilities rest on the State, and there is a consensus that this is so. But it would be important to spell out also the possible responsibilities of the private sector, media, academics, leaders, and NGOs, to name a few. May be this point goes without saying but we feel it is essential to success.

Addressing The Immediate Agenda

There is a long list of themes dominating the development agenda, but some are of specific interest to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Herewith some general views on those matters.

The Role of Globalization. Often there is a debate regarding the extent to which globalization hinders the implementation of those rights. But in actual fact it is impossible to say a lot without ending with an answer that will satisfy nobody. While it is easy to link all evils and problems societies are facing to globalization, this is simply an oxymoron. Information is essential to the implementation of rights. This is the era of information and interconnectedness. Many people now know in real time that some rights are being violated and thus thanks to the rapid speed of globalization it is now possible to attain a number of rights.

But, one is not advocating that globalization does not have some important negative effects. And the question for a debate on this matter must focus on the variables and the constants of this process. Many of the policy aspects could in principle be modified to accommodate human rights concerns at all levels, be them economic, social or cultural. In addition, it is not possible to think about globalization without identifying the actors involved. And, it is at the level of these actors where correction factors must be included. Otherwise, globalization becomes a ghost to whom everyone complains about but we remain hopeless.

The Fight Against Poverty. A lot has been said above about poverty eradication and rights. If one looks at the historic records of the Committee and of the Commission, the issue of poverty eradication has always been central to the debate. This has been accentuated in the debate on the RTD.

But is poverty eradication a necessary or a sufficient condition for the attainment of rights or the respect of rights, or the implementation of economic and social rights? The answer is not always clear, as the arguments made do not hold in both directions. First, it is true that attacking poverty most societies will see many of the economic, social and cultural rights being implemented as a result. But raising the standard of living of the poor can be done in many different ways, and the question of whether the process leads to a society that respects rights is still valid. Thus, poverty eradication is only a necessary condition.

In this context, and to be able to claim a right-based approach to the problem, it is essential to distinguish between the private and the public good nature of poverty. And this demands a much more detail discussion regarding what poverty is all about. The nature of poverty must come out in its human, income, wealth, demographic, ethnic, racial, gender, age-related, social, spiritual, cultural, ethical ... dimensions.

Thus, the fights against poverty will only guarantee the effectiveness of economic, social and cultural rights depending on how one sees its nature and scope.

The Hierarchy of Decision-Making. There are a number of principles in the human rights arena that are important and need to be mainstream in economic decision-making. Examples of these are indivisibility and universality. In fact, many of the criteria to assess progress towards the implementation of rights are based on those principles. But, often a question is raised if these principles can be applied from one day to the other and to what extent there is cultural relativity in both its interpretation and implementation.

It is easy to answer no, and leave the question of hierarchy, progressivity, trade-offs and affordability on the side. However, as a matter of fact, because the "train is moving" and the state of play is such that rights are being violated, the attainment of rights in practice must somehow focus on the availability of resources and how best to allocate these resources among competing uses. Thus, for example, regarding economic rights, one may pose the question of legitimacy to a development program that only allow beneficiaries to attain two dollars a day, even if that meant a double of their income with respect to the situation without the project.

There is obvious solution to this dilemma, and it is the society in question that must resolve it and not the international development institutions. This issue is over and above the one of "compensation criteria" debated within the context of the RTD. There may be a clash of approach between economics and international law. This is a matter that needs much more research and studies to establish best practices.

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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION "ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS" ORGANIZED IN COOPERATION WITH THE HIGH COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (FRANCE)

Monday, 7 May 2001

The social dimension of the European Union's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Background paper submitted by Michel Dispersyn, Professor at the University of Brussels, Visiting Professor at the Universities of Bordeaux and Nantes, associate member of the Comparative Labour and Social Security Law Centre of Montesquieu University - Bordeaux IV (COMPTRASEC-UMR CNRS 5114)*

* The views expressed in the background paper, which is issued as received, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat.

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SUMMARY

This background paper focuses on the topic of the call for papers, namely, economic, social and cultural rights and development strategies and deals primarily with the first part: development strategies and the recognition of economic and social rights. It also discusses the second part, i.e. the inclusion of economic and social rights in existing mechanisms.

The purpose of the background paper is to study the social dimension of the European Union's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). A special incentive arrangement on labour rights has been implemented since 1998 as part of the European Union's system of generalized tariff preferences. The arrangement takes the form of preferences in addition to the basic preferential margin. These preferences may be granted to developing countries which request them and provide evidence that they have adopted and are applying domestic legal provisions incorporating the substance of International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 concerning the right to organize and to bargain collectively and ILO Convention No. 138 concerning the minimum age for admission to employment.

This special arrangement might be called a social clause which is incentive-based and part of the European Union's development policy. The aim is to encourage GSP beneficiary countries to comply with certain internationally recognized social standards and to prohibit some practices such as child labour, which are often associated with underdevelopment, without, however, forcing them formally to ratify the ILO Conventions embodying such standards. The inclusion of a social dimension in the European Union's international trade is undeniably a major innovation. The special arrangement is a basic instrument for the promotion and development of fundamental labour rights.

Over two years after the adoption of the regulation implementing the social clause, it must be recognized that special incentive arrangements concerning labour rights have had little success. Only the Republic of Moldova has requested and obtained access to the special arrangement. The Russian Federation has also applied for such an arrangement and its application is under review. The results of special incentive arrangements are thus quite meagre and the background paper tries to determine the reasons for this lack of success, proposes possible solutions and suggests the possibility of cooperation between the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO and the EU.

There is also a general clause on the temporary withdrawal of GSP benefits. In this connection, it is a welcome development that the European Union has, for the first time, penalized the Union of Myanmar (Burma), a country which violates fundamental social rights. It is to be hoped, however, that this procedure will not be applied only to countries with the weakest economic power. The background paper evaluates the possibility of the withdrawal of benefits.

1. The European Union grants preferential access to its market for certain products originating in developing countries. The aim of this Community development policy is to facilitate the gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy. The main objective of Community development cooperation policy is, moreover, to promote the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; and the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.[1]

2. Preferential access to the market of the European Union varies, however, depending on the developing country in question. We shall first look at the position of the generalized system of preferences (GSP) in what is commonly known as the pyramid of trade preferences (I) and then go on to consider a recent major development in the European Union's generalized system of preferences, namely, the inclusion of a social dimension (II). In our opinion, it is preferable to refer to a "social dimension" rather than to a "social clause" because the arrangement introduced in the generalized system of tariff preferences is designed to encourage the protection of some fundamental labour rights and it is promotional, incentive-based and optional in nature, and not a genuine binding social clause to which penalties attach. It will, however, be seen that there is a fine line between an incentive arrangement which may be withdrawn and which may be similar to a penalty, and a social clause, non-compliance with which may be penalized. We will therefore also use the term "social clause" to refer to this new social dimension. The present background paper, which is necessarily limited, will analyse and evaluate this new social dimension, which is recent and not very well known, but will not analyse the concept of a social clause as such and will, in particular, not refer to the arguments for and against this clause, which has been extensively studied in the abundant scientific literature.

I. THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES IN THE PYRAMID OF TRADE PREFERENCES

3. In some cases, treatment is more preferential than in others. Very schematically, the top of the pyramid includes the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries), which were linked to the European Union by the fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, of December 1989, as revised by the agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995. This Convention was followed by the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed on 23 June 2000.[2] The ACP countries are at the top of the hierarchy of trade preferences in terms of levels of tariff reductions and categories of products covered. In practice, they may export industrial products duty free and without any quantitative restriction, while agricultural products are virtually exempt from customs duties.

4. Lower down on the pyramid are the countries linked to the European Union by bilateral, economic and trade agreements. The European Union has concluded such agreements with southern European countries (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey), with Eastern Mediterranean countries (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) and with North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia). The purpose of these agreements is the granting of trade preferences for exports to the member States of the European Union. Such preferences are usually lower than those granted to the ACP States.

5. At the base of the pyramid are the Asian and Latin American countries, which have benefited from the Generalized System of Preferences since 1971. Some Andean countries (GSP since 1990) and Central American countries (GSP since 1992), which are taking part in action to combat drugs, benefit from a more favourable GSP, at a level that is comparable, for some products, to the preferences granted under the Lomé Convention.

6. Since tariff concessions for the other countries are lower than those under the Lomé Convention and the Mediterranean Agreements, it is primarily the Asian and Latin American countries which will actually use the GSP, even though all developing countries may theoretically be GSP beneficiaries. In principle, the GSP covers all of the 180 beneficiary countries listed in Annex III of Regulation No. 2820/98,[3] but, in practice, the majority of preferential industrial imports, of which there are many more than agricultural imports, focuses on about a dozen countries, of which China is the first beneficiary country. It is also first in terms of total preferential imports, far ahead of the other beneficiary countries.

7. The purpose of the system is to promote the economic and industrial development of the developing countries. The system was set up by derogation from the GATT rules.[4] It was adopted for a period of 10 years and has been renewed since 1980 by virtue of a permanent derogation.[5] Although it is based on article 133 of the Treaty on European Union,[6] which relates to the foundations of the common commercial policy, the GSP is also an instrument for the development of the least developed countries and it is an instrument that supplements GATT in the sense that it is designed to enable the least developed countries to become part of the international economy and join the World Trade Organization (WTO).

8. The first generalized tariff preference scheme was thus adopted by the Community in 1971. In accordance with the offer it made in the context of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,[7] the Community opened up generalized tariff preferences for some agricultural and industrial products from developing countries as of 1971. The scheme was available for an initial period of 10 years and ended on 31 December 1980. It was renewed for a further 10-year period, which ended on 31 December 1990. It was then changed and extended until 31 December 1994, when the second generalized tariff preference system was established. At that time, the Community opened a further 10-year period (1995-2004) for its offer.

9. The first scheme provided for an exemption from import duties for nearly all manufactures and for a reduction in duties for some agricultural products. Quantitative restrictions were, however, established for some products, such as textiles and other products regarded as sensitive, in order to protect the interests of Community industries for which such imports would give rise to problems. Although imports of agricultural products were not subject to quotas, the number of agricultural products in question and the preferential margins were usually not very high. The GSP involves granting tariff reductions on imports from developing countries. It is a unilateral, non-reciprocal and generalized tariff instrument, in that reductions are in principle applicable to all developing countries.

10. The Lomé Convention did not contain a genuine social clause involving a specific penalty for non-compliance with particular social standards. In the version revised by the November 1995 agreement, it did, however, contain some very general provisions on respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law.[8] There was also a clause suspending

development assistance in the event of non-compliance with these elements. The same is true of the Cotonou ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, in which the parties reiterate their deep attachment to human dignity and rights and undertake to promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and all human rights, especially economic and social rights.[9] The Agreement also provides[10] that, if a party considers that the other has failed to fulfil an obligation relating to respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, a procedure is provided that may also lead, in the last resort, to suspension. Other instruments, such as some bilateral trade agreements, also contain general clauses of this kind relating to respect for fundamental rights.

11. The case of the Community GSP is entirely different and will therefore be the main focus of our attention. The generalized tariff preferences system set up in 1971 did not contain any provision that could be construed as a kind of social clause. A social dimension was introduced in the GSP on 1 January 1995 and it was considerably strengthened by the adoption of an implementing regulation which entered into force on 5 June 1998.[11]

12. The second generalized system of tariff preferences (GSP), as extensively amended, was set up by Council Regulations (EC) Nos. 3281/94 and 1256/96 of 19 December 1994 and 20 June 1996, respectively.[12] The first Regulation was applicable for the period from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 1998 in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries. The second was applicable from 1 January 1997 to 30 June 1999 in respect of certain agricultural products originating in those countries.

13. The GSP provides for a general arrangement and special incentive arrangements. The current general arrangement[13] includes a modulation mechanism, a graduation mechanism, a safeguard clause and two support arrangements, one for the least developed countries and the other for the fight against drugs.

14. The modulation mechanism modulates the preferential margin according to the degree of sensitivity of products imported into the European Union market. Each product is classified according to its sensitivity in one of the four categories corresponding to different preferential margins. These categories are: very sensitive products, for which the preferential margin is 15 per cent (the preferential duty applicable to products in this category is thus equal to 85 per cent of the Common Customs Tariff duty applicable to the product in question, without prejudice to the provisions on the special incentive arrangements which will be referred to below), sensitive products, for which the preferential margin is 30 per cent, semi-sensitive products, for which the preferential margin is 65 per cent, and non-sensitive products, for which the preferential margin is 100 per cent.

15. A graduation mechanism was set up in 1986. Its purpose is to prevent some GSP beneficiary countries from carving out an essential share of the total GSP, since all countries do not have the same needs in terms of preferential advantages. Consequently, the mechanism provides that, when a country has achieved a particular level of development and thus of competitiveness, this leads to a gradual withdrawal of preferential treatment. The GSP is thus intended to be transitional.

16. The least developed countries[14] benefit from an even more favourable support arrangement. Council Regulation (EC) No. 602/98 granted the least developed countries which are not members of the Lomé Convention advantages equal to those granted to the member countries of that Convention.[15] Council Regulation (EC) No. 416/2001[16] extended duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to products originating in the least developed countries, with the exception of weapons and ammunition.

17. A similar support arrangement was implemented in 1990 for four Andean Community countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia), to which a fifth Andean country, Venezuela, was added in 1995. Six Central American countries belonging to the Central American Common Market (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama) have also benefited from this support arrangement since 1992.[17] Common Customs Tariff duties are totally suspended for the countries taking part in the fight against drugs in order to reduce their economic dependence on drugs.

18. The GSP scheme also contains a safeguard clause providing that, where a product originating in one of the countries or territories listed in Annex III of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 is imported on terms which cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties to a Community producer of like or directly competing products, Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be reintroduced at any time at the request of a member State or on the Commission's own initiative.[18] This clause has been applied in only one case. In 1998, Spain requested[19] the reinstatement of the Common Customs Tariff for tinned tuna originating in Ecuador, but then withdrew its request[20] and the procedure was therefore dropped.

19. Special incentive arrangements[21] are applicable in principle as from 1 January 1998. They take the form of additional preferences, over and above the basic preferential margin. They may be granted to developing countries which request them and provide proof that they have adopted and actually apply domestic legal provisions incorporating the substance of the standards laid down in International Labour Organization Convention Nos. 87 and 98 concerning the right to organize and the right to bargain collectively and Convention No. 138 concerning the minimum age for admission to employment. The special incentive arrangement is what might be called a social clause, which is primarily incentive-based and part of the European Union's development policy. The aim is to encourage GSP beneficiary countries to comply with certain internationally recognized social standards and to prohibit some practices that are often associated with underdevelopment, such as child labour, without forcing these countries formally to ratify the international ILO conventions embodying these standards.

20. The modalities for the implementation of the special incentive arrangements and their intensity are to be determined later, following a review by the Council on the basis of internationally accepted, objective and operational criteria. As the Regulation invited it to do, the Council carried out this review on the basis of the Commission's reports on the results of the studies carried out, inter alia, by the ILO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the relationship between trade and labour rights. In the light of this review, the Council took the view that the results of the international discussion on the social and environmental clauses constituted an incentive to prepare a positive instrument encouraging respect for social and environmental standards. The Council therefore adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1154/98 of 25 May 1998 applying the special

incentive arrangements concerning labour rights and environmental protection provided for in articles 7 and 8 of Regulations (EC) No. 3281/94 and (EC) No. 1256/96 applying multiannual schemes of generalized tariff preferences in respect of certain industrial and agricultural products originating in developing countries.[22] This Regulation entered into force on 5 June 1998 and expires on the date of expiration of Regulations (EC) No. 3281/94 and (EC) No. 1256/96, i.e. 30 June 1999, the date of expiration of Regulation (EC) No. 1256/96.[23]

21. A new regulation on generalized tariff preferences granted to developing countries to encourage their exports to the European Union was adopted on 21 December 1998, namely, Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 applying a multiannual scheme of generalized tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001.[24] Council Regulations (EC) No. 3281/94 of 19 December 1994 on industrial products and No. 1256/96 of 20 June 1996 on agricultural products were merged on the basis of this new Regulation, which also incorporates various other texts, including Regulation (EC) No. 1154/98 of 25 May 1998 applying special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and environmental protection. It should be noted, however, that this new Regulation did not make any particular changes in the rules for the implementation of the social clause (special incentive arrangement for the protection of labour rights), which were described briefly above and will be analysed in part II of this paper. The special incentive arrangement for the protection of labour rights is the only one that will be dealt with in this paper.

22. A scheme for the period 2002-2004 is already being prepared. A proposal by the Commission will probably be submitted to the Council in March 2001. The basic principles of the GSP, which were decided on in 1995 for a 10-year period, will be reviewed in 2004 in the light of new elements, such as new multilateral trade liberalizations within the World Trade Organization, the adoption of the Cotonou ECP-EU Partnership Agreement and prospects for the possible expansion of the European Union.

II. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES

23. The special incentive arrangement for the protection of labour rights[25] mainly provides for an additional reduction in the applicable preferential duty, which varies according to the type and sensitivity of products.

24. The additional preferential margin applicable to agricultural products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff listed in Annex I of the Regulation is 10 per cent of the Common Customs Tariff duty for very sensitive products (the normal preferential margin, as indicated above, being 15 per cent, the total preferential margin, i.e. the normal margin plus the additional margin, is therefore 25 per cent), 20 per cent of the duty for sensitive products (total margin, 50 per cent) and 35 per cent of the duty for semi-sensitive products (total margin, 100 per cent). The additional preferential margin applicable to industrial products in Chapters 25 to 97 of the Common Customs Tariff, excluding Chapter 93, which are listed in Annex I of the Regulation is 15 per cent of the duty for very sensitive products (total margin, 30 per cent), 25 per cent of the duty for sensitive products (total margin, 55 per cent) and 35 per cent of the duty for semi-sensitive products (total margin, 100 per cent).

25. The technique used is thus to grant an additional preference to countries which request it and which provide proof that they have implemented legislation incorporating the substance of internationally recognized social standards. The procedure provides that these reductions are applicable to products originating in the beneficiary countries concerned,[26] on condition that the authorities of these countries have addressed a written request to the Commission for the granting of the special arrangement for products originating in these countries and specifying: the domestic legal provisions, the complete text of which must, together with an authentic translation into one of the languages of the Community, be annexed and incorporate the substance of the provisions of International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138, the measures taken to ensure implementation and monitoring and the commitment fully to assume monitoring of the implementation of the special arrangement and the related administrative cooperation methods. It should be noted that the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement must not necessarily have ratified these ILO Conventions. It is the incorporation of the substance of these standards in their legislation that is taken into account.

26. Of the standards covered by the many ILO Conventions, those relating to trade union freedom and the protection of trade union rights (Convention No. 87, 1948), the right to organize and to bargain collectively (Convention No. 98, 1949) and the minimum age for admission to employment (Convention No. 138, 1973) seem to be the most likely to improve social progress. It should be recalled that Convention No. 87 relates to the freely exercised right of workers and employers, without distinction, to organize to promote and defend their interests. Convention No. 98 relates in particular to the protection of workers who exercise the right to organize. It provides for non-interference between workers' organizations and employers' organizations and the promotion of voluntary collective bargaining. Convention No. 138 prohibits child labour and defines the minimum age of employment in relation to the school-leaving age (usually at least 15 years). It provides that the minimum age for admission to any type of employment or work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons should not be less than 18 years.

27. Some member States and various trade union circles said it was regrettable that discrimination had not been taken into account. ILO Conventions such as the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100, 1951) and the Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation Convention (No. 111, 1958) could have been added to the body of standards referred to in the social clause. However, in view of the status of the implementation of these standards in potential beneficiary countries, it may be considered that, if these conventions had been added, these countries would have requested the granting of the special incentive arrangement for labour rights even less. Because of the relative failure of the social clause (see below), it is quite unlikely that the substance of the social clause will be amended in the next GSP or during the next 10-year period. It is, however, likely that, during the next revision of the social clause, the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182, 17 June 1999), which follows on from the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment Convention (No. 138, 26 June 1973), will be incorporated in the social clause. This would, moreover, be in keeping with a recommendation by the Commission to the member States on 15 September 2000 concerning the ratification of Convention No. 182.[27]

28. The purpose of the GSP is therefore unilaterally to promote compliance with certain standards of conduct through the social clause, and this may be open to criticism. It should also be noted that respect for the provisions of ILO Conventions is being imposed unilaterally, even though they have not necessarily been ratified by all member States of the European Union. For example, as at 31 December 1999, Convention No. 138 had not yet been ratified by Austria and the United Kingdom.[28] The credibility of the mechanism would be strengthened if all member States of the European Union had ratified all three Conventions.

29. It will be further noted that the approach followed is that of the ILO, namely, a non-binding and promotional approach to fundamental social rights to be protected,[29] which does not try, as on social issues within the member States of the European Union (admittedly in a limited way), to find a form of harmonization by normative and binding means. This approach has therefore not been transposed to relations between the member States and third States, since it is limited to the promotion of respect for standards of conduct acceptable to all.

30. The submission of a request by a beneficiary country is announced by the Commission in the Official Journal. The notice states that any useful information relating to the request may be communicated to the Commission by any interested physical or legal person. The Commission then considers the request. It determines not only whether the legislation incorporates the substance of the standards, but also what measures have been taken to ensure the effective application and monitoring of these provisions. The Commission may ask for any information it deems necessary and check this information with competent persons. It may also carry out checks in requesting countries, in cooperation with them, in order to verify all or part of the information collected. The Commission then decides to grant the benefit of the special arrangement to products originating in the requesting country or not to grant the benefit of this arrangement if it considers that the legislative implementing and monitoring provisions of the country concerned do not guarantee the effective application of ILO Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138. The Commission may also decide to grant the benefit of the special arrangement to certain production sectors only if, following its review, it considers that these three Conventions are being fully implemented only in these sectors. Thus far, there has been no case of the application of the special arrangement to one sector.

31. The procedure thus has several components: the evaluation by the Commission of the ILO Conventions on the basis of the definition of the substance of the standards adopted by the ILO, the monitoring and evaluation by the Commission of means of ensuring compliance with the Conventions and the decision by the Commission. It may be asked whether the Commission has the necessary resources and know-how to carry out these tasks, in particular with regard to the actual assessment of the incorporation of the substance of ILO standards. Because of the small number of requests,[30] the problem has so far probably not been too serious, but the request recently made by the Russian Federation, or a large number of new requests, might create additional work for the Commission and thus require new measures to cope with it.

32. In this connection, consideration should probably be given to the possibility of cooperation with the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is the guardian of the International Covenant of 19 December 1966 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council, as well as with the International Labour Organization. The States parties to the Covenant undertake, inter alia, to

ensure the right to trade union freedom and protection of trade union rights, based on respect for ILO Convention No. 87 of 1948.[31] They also recognize that children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation and that age limits below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law should be set.[32] As these rights are also referred to in the provisions of ILO Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138, which are the subject of the social clause, cooperation and technical assistance between the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO and the European Union might therefore be usefully established.

33. Part IV of the Covenant states that the Economic and Social Council may make arrangements with the specialized agencies of the United Nations in respect of the submission of reports on the progress made in achieving the observance of the provisions of the Covenant.[33] The Council may also bring to the attention of other organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in part IV of the Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the Covenant. Such measures include the furnishing of technical assistance.[34]

34. Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 also provides for a monitoring procedure and administrative cooperation methods. Monitoring is based primarily on confidence in the authorities of the beneficiary countries and the cooperation of the beneficiary countries, which are called on to certify that the products manufactured in those countries have been manufactured under conditions complying with the provisions of the three Conventions. The future will show how effective this monitoring is.

35. Two years after the adoption of the Regulation instituting the social clause, it must be recognized that the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights have had little success. Only the Republic of Moldova requested the benefit of the special arrangement on 11 February 1999.[35] The arrangement was granted to it by Regulation (EC) No. 1649/2000 of 25 July 2000,[36] since the Commission considered that the domestic legal provisions of the Republic of Moldova did incorporate the substance of the standards embodied in International Labour Organization Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138 and that the Moldovan authorities had taken all the necessary measures for the effective application and monitoring of those provisions. This Regulation entered into force on 1 November 2000.

36. The Russian Federation also submitted a request to the Commission.[37] On 9 June 1999, the authorities of the Russian Federation submitted a copy of their domestic legal provisions incorporating the substance of International Labour Organization Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138. This request is under consideration by the Commission.

37. The special incentive arrangement concerning labour rights may be temporarily withdrawn in whole or in part from a country where there is sufficient evidence to establish that that country has not complied with its commitments to implement legislation incorporating the substance of the standards embodied in ILO Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138. It should be noted that this is not strictly speaking a penalty, but a withdrawal of the benefits of the special arrangement. It may be asked whether this distinction is not purely theoretical. The withdrawal

decision is not automatic. It may be adopted only following a specific procedure. As only one country has quite recently obtained the benefit of the special arrangement, as indicated above, there have naturally not yet been any cases where this withdrawal procedure has been applied.

38. The withdrawal of the advantages of the special arrangement does not, however, prejudge the possible application of the general temporary withdrawal clause, which may also be seen as a "penalty" provided for by article 22 of Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998. This provision refers to the possibility of the temporary withdrawal in whole or in part of all the advantages of the generalized system of preferences provided for by Regulation No. 2820/98 (the general system and, if so agreed, the special arrangement) in the following circumstances:

Practice of any form of slavery or forced labour as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 25 September 1926 and 7 September 1956 and International Labour Organization Conventions No. 29 and No. 105;

Export of goods made by prison labour;

Manifest shortcomings in customs controls on export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors) or failure to comply with international conventions on money laundering;

Fraud or failure to provide administrative cooperation as required for the verification of certificates of origin;

In manifest cases of unfair trading practices on the part of a beneficiary country. The withdrawal must be in full compliance with WTO rules;

Manifest cases of infringement of the objectives of international conventions such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources.

39. Temporary withdrawal is not automatic, but follows specific procedural requirements.[38] Cases which might lead to temporary withdrawal measures may be brought to the Commission's attention by a member State or by any natural or legal person or association not endowed with legal personality which can show an interest in such withdrawal. The Commission examines the complaint in consultation with the Generalized Preferences Committee.[39] Where the Commission finds, following these consultations, that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation, it announces the initiation of the investigation in the Official Journal and conducts the investigation for up to one year in consultation with the Committee. It seeks any information it deems necessary and verifies it with economic operators and the competent authorities of the beneficiary country concerned. It may dispatch its own experts to that country. When the investigation is completed, the Commission submits a report on its findings to the Committee. If the Commission considers temporary withdrawal unnecessary, it

publishes a notice in the Official Journal announcing the termination of the investigation and setting out its main conclusions. If it considers temporary withdrawal necessary, it submits the proposal to the Council, which decides on it by a qualified majority within 30 days.

40. The procedure thus involves three phases. The first is the phase of consultation with the Committee. This phase is confidential and is designed to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the opening of an investigation. The second phase is the investigation itself, which is also confidential. It is initiated by the publication of a notice in the Official Journal and is conducted by the Commission in consultation with the Committee. The third phase is the decision-making phase, which may lead to a notice of termination or to the temporary withdrawal of the system of preferences.

41. Thus far, two complaints have been introduced under this procedure, the first relating to Myanmar (Burma) and the second to Pakistan. Only the first led to the temporary withdrawal of GSP advantages (only the general system was involved). The case was brought as a result of a joint complaint filed on 7 June 1995 by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC),[40] on the grounds of the forced labour practised in Myanmar. The consultations held in late 1995 led to the opening of an investigation[41] in early 1996. Upon completion of the investigation, a report was submitted to the Generalized Preferences Committee on 4 December 1996. On the basis of this report and on the proposal of the Commission, access to the generalized tariff preferences granted by Regulations (EC) No. 3281/94 and (EC) No. 1256/96 was wholly withdrawn on a temporary basis from the Union of Myanmar by Council Regulation (EC) No. 552/97 of 24 March 1997.[42]

42. During the Commission's investigation, it was found that the Myanmar authorities resorted to the systematic and widespread use of forced labour, which was imposed on everyone - men, women and children, without distinction as to age or state of health and without the slightest remuneration. The only way to avoid it was to pay "compensation" to the authorities and only privileged persons could do so. Forced labour was used not only for military operations (porterage for the army in some areas of conflict with ethnic minorities), but also to build civilian and military infrastructures (roads, railway, landing strips, army buildings and civilian buildings such as hotels). It should be noted that the Myanmar military regime tried to refute these allegations, which had, however, been established by many documents and testimonies, and refused to receive a commission of inquiry in the country.

43. According to the Regulation, the total withdrawal of GSP benefits from Myanmar, i.e. the withdrawal of the application of tariff preferences to industrial and agricultural products originating in Myanmar, will end when it has been found, on the basis of a report by the Commission, that an end has been put to the practice of any form of slavery, as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 25 September 1926 and 7 September 1956 and ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105, namely, the practices which led to the withdrawal from Myanmar of access to generalized tariff preferences.

44. A second complaint was filed on 12 June 1995, also on the grounds of forced labour. The complaint concerns Pakistan and it was filed by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In this case as well, only the general system was involved. The procedure stopped at the

consultation phase. The Commission decided to keep the case open, but not to go on to the second phase in order to give priority to cooperation with the Pakistan authorities. A distinction was made between the forced labour of children, the subject of the complaint, and child labour, which is often necessary in developing countries in order to help ensure the survival of families. The Pakistan authorities eventually adopted measures in order to find a solution to the problem of child labour.

45. The inclusion of a social dimension in the European Union's international trade is undeniably a major innovation. The special incentive arrangement concerning labour rights is a basic instrument for the promotion and development of fundamental labour rights.

46. However, the special incentive arrangement for labour rights is limited in scope. It has no impact on products which are already admitted to the Community market at the zero tariff level, such as non-sensitive products and those originating in the Andean countries (support system for action to combat drugs) and the least developed countries (support system for the least developed countries). Perhaps consideration should be given to the possibility of adopting additional special measures for these countries.

47. The GSP - and this will probably also be the case of the special arrangements - is, as stated above, very focused in geographical terms and limited to a small number of countries.

48. The results of the special incentive arrangement are also quite meagre, since only two countries have requested access to the special arrangement, namely, the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, and only Moldova has obtained access so far.

49. There are several reasons for this lack of success. In the first place, some developing countries are fundamentally opposed to or at least wary of a social clause mechanism creating a link between trade and social - or environmental - standards. Some countries fear not only interference by the Commission in their internal affairs, considering that it is not qualified to take decisions, but also a negative response by the Commission to any request they might make.

50. In addition, the social clause is not understood as an incentive-based and optional mechanism, but, rather, as a penalty.

51. It may also be noted that some countries probably take the view that the additional margins are not worth the effort they are required to make in return. The information given to potential beneficiary countries is definitely insufficient, especially as many countries do incorporate the substance of ILO standards in their legislation.

52. With regard to the temporary withdrawal clause, it is to be welcomed that, for the first time, the European Union has penalized a country which violates fundamental social rights. It is, however, to be hoped that this procedure will not be applied only to countries with the weakest economic power.

Notes

[1] TEU, art. 177 (ex. art. 130u).

[2] Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou, Benin, on 23 June 2000, OJEC, L 317, 15 December 2000.

[3] For this Regulation, see below.

[4] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Derogation from article 1, by a decision of the GATT Contracting Parties dated 25 June 1971.

[5] Under an enabling clause adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties on 28 November 1979.

[6] TEU, art. 133 (ex. art. 113).

[7] UNCTAD.

[8] Article 5 of the Lomé Convention.

[9] Article 9.2 of the Agreement.

[10] Article 96 of the Agreement.

[11] See below for Regulation No. 1154/98 of 25 May 1998.

[12] Council Regulation (EC) No. 3281/94 of 19 December 1994 applying a multiannual scheme of generalized tariff preferences for the period 1995-1998 in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries, OJEC, 31 December 1994, No. L 348, p. 1. Last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 602/98, OJEC, 18 March 1998, No. L 80, p. 1. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1256/96 of 20 June 1996 applying a multiannual scheme of generalized tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1999 in respect of certain agricultural products originating in developing countries, OJEC, 29 June 1996, No. L 160, p. 1. Last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 602/98.

[13] The analysis of the current general arrangement is based on Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual scheme of generalized tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001, OJEC, 30 December 1998, No. L 357, arts. 2 to 7. For this Regulation, see below.

[14] For the list of these countries, as recognized by the United Nations, see the list contained in Annex IV of the Regulation, p. 82.

[15] Council Regulation (EC) No. 602/98, OJEC, 18 March 1998, No. L 80, p. 1.

[16] Council Regulation (EC) No. 416/2001 of 28 February 2001 amending, inter alia, article 6 of Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 so as to extend duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to products originating in the least developed countries, OJEC, 1 March 2001, No. L 60, p. 43.

[17] The list of these countries is contained in Annex V of the Regulation.

[18] Article 28 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98. This provision was supplemented by a clause providing for the temporary suspension of preferences in the event of massive increases in imports of products originating in the least developed countries, as added by Council Regulation (EC) No. 416/2001.

[19] Opinion No. 98/C 8/04, OJEC, 13 January 1998, C/8, p. 3.

[20] Opinion No. 98/C 357/06, OJEC, 21 November 1998, C/357, p. 14.

[21] Articles 7 and 8 of Regulations (EC) No. 3281/94 and No. 1256/96 define the principle of the social clause. For the principle of the environmental clause, see article 8 of these Regulations and below.

[22] OJEC, No. L 160 of 4 June 1998, pp. 1-10.

[23] Regulation (EC) No. 3281/94 was supposed to expire on 31 December 1998, but it was extended until 30 June 1999 by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998. For the latter Regulation, see below.

[24] Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual system of generalized tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001, OJEC, 30 December 1998, No. L 357, pp. 1-14 and annexes, as well as the corrigendum thereto, OJEC, 17 July 1999, No. L 184, p. 50.

[25] Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998, articles 8 to 15.

[26] These countries are listed in Annex III.

[27] Recommendation by the Commission of 15 September 2000 on the ratification of International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 of 17 June 1999 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. C (2000) 2674)-(2000/581/EC), 28 September 2000, OJEC, L 243, p. 41.

[28] International Labour Conference, 88th session, 2000, List of Ratifications by convention and by country (as at 31 December 1999), International Labour Office, Geneva, pp. 160-161.

[29] See the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted on 18 June 1998 in Geneva by the 86th International Labour Conference.

[30] On this question, see below.

[31] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, done at New York on 19 December 1966, part III, article 8.

[32] Idem, part III, article 10.

[33] Idem, part IV, article 18.

[34] Idem, part IV, articles 22 and 23.

[35] Notice regarding the request submitted by the Republic of Moldova to take advantage of the special incentive arrangement concerning labour rights (1999/C 176/14), OJEC, 22 June 1999, C 176, p. 13.

[36] Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1649/2000 of 25 July 2000 granting the Republic of Moldova the benefit of the special incentive arrangement concerning labour rights, OJEC, 27 July 2000, L 189, p. 13.

[37] Notice regarding the request submitted by the Russian Federation to take advantage of the special incentive arrangement concerning labour rights (1999/C 218/02), OJEC, 30 July 1999, C 218, p. 2.

[38] Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998, articles 22 to 26.

[39] This Committee, which is referred to in article 31 of Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 (see below), was established by article 17 of Regulation (EC) No. 3281/94. It is composed of representatives of member States and presided over by a representative of the Commission.

[40] This complaint was subsequently also supported by Human Rights Watch.

[41] Opinion No. 96/C 15/03, OJEC, 20 January 1996, No. C 15.

[42] Council Regulation (EC) No. 552/97 of 24 March 1997 temporarily withdrawing access to generalized tariff preferences from the Union of Myanmar, OJEC, 27 March 1997, No. L 85, pp. 8-9. According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998, Council Regulation (EC) No. 552/97 of 24 March 1997, which refers to Regulations (EC) No. 3281/94 and (EC) No. 1256/96, is supposed to refer, mutatis mutandis, to Regulation No. 2820/98.

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
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Geneva, 23 April-11 May 2001
Agenda item 5

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: POVERTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ON 4 MAY 2001

1. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established that poverty is a human rights issue.[1] This view has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions by various United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights.[2] Although the term is not explicitly used in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,[3] poverty is one of the recurring themes in the Covenant and has always been one of the central concerns of the Committee. The rights to work, an adequate standard of living, housing, food, health and education, which lie at the heart of the Covenant, have a direct and immediate bearing upon the eradication of poverty. Moreover, the issue of poverty frequently arises in the course of the Committee's constructive dialogue with States parties. In the light of experience gained over many years, including the examination of numerous States parties' reports, the Committee holds the firm view that poverty constitutes a denial of human rights.

2. Accordingly, the Committee warmly welcomes the renewed commitment of a number of States and international organizations to the policy objective of poverty eradication, as well as related policy goals such as the elimination of social exclusion. The Committee regrets, however, that the human rights dimensions of poverty eradication policies rarely receive the attention they deserve. This neglect is especially regrettable because a human rights approach to poverty can reinforce anti-poverty strategies and make them more effective.

3. The present statement is aimed at encouraging the integration of human rights into poverty eradication policies by outlining how human rights generally, and the Covenant in particular, can empower the poor and enhance anti-poverty strategies. It is not sought in this statement to formulate a detailed anti-poverty programme or plan of action, but to identify concisely the distinctive contribution of international human rights to poverty eradication. The preparation of operational anti-poverty programmes is a separate undertaking of the first importance which all actors should pursue as a matter of urgency and with due regard to international human rights.

The scale and nature of the problem

4. The President of the World Bank recently wrote: "[P]overty remains a global problem of huge proportions. Of the world's 6 billion people, 2.8 billion live on less than $2 a day, and 1.2 billion on less than $1 a day. Six infants of every 100 do not see their first birthday, and 8 do not survive to their fifth. Of those who do reach school age, 9 boys in 100, and 14 girls, do not go to primary school."[4] While statistics do not provide a complete understanding of poverty, these shocking figures signify massive and systemic breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants, as well as of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments.

5. Poverty is not confined to developing countries and societies in transition, it is a global phenomenon experienced in varying degrees by all States. Many developed States have impoverished groups, such as minorities or indigenous peoples, within their jurisdictions. Also, within many rich countries there are rural and urban areas where people live in appalling conditions - pockets of poverty amid wealth. In all States, women and girls bear a disproportionate burden of poverty, and children growing up in poverty are often permanently disadvantaged. In the Committee's view, the greater empowerment of women in particular is an essential precondition for the eradication of global poverty.

6. While the common theme underlying poor people's experiences is one of powerlessness,[5] human rights can empower individuals and communities. The challenge is to connect the powerless with the empowering potential of human rights. Although human rights are not a panacea, they can help to equalize the distribution and exercise of power within and between societies.

Definitions

7. In the recent past, poverty was often defined as insufficient income to buy a minimum basket of goods and services. Today, the term is usually understood more broadly as the lack of basic capabilities to live in dignity. This definition recognizes poverty's broader features, such as hunger, poor education, discrimination, vulnerability and social exclusion.[6] The Committee notes that this understanding of poverty corresponds with numerous provisions of the Covenant.

8. In the light of the International Bill of Rights, poverty may be defined as a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and

other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. While acknowledging that there is no universally accepted definition, the Committee endorses this multi-dimensional understanding of poverty, which reflects the indivisible and interdependent nature of all human rights.

The international human rights normative framework

9. International human rights provide a framework of norms or rules upon which detailed global, national and community-level poverty eradication policies can be constructed. While poverty raises complex multi-sectoral issues that are not amenable to simple solutions, the application of the international human rights normative framework to these issues helps to ensure that essential elements of anti-poverty strategies, such as non-discrimination, equality, participation and accountability, receive the sustained attention they deserve. In this context, the Committee wishes to highlight briefly three features of the international human rights normative framework.

10. *First*, the normative framework encompasses the entire range of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, and the right to development. While the rights enumerated in the Covenant, such as the right to an adequate standard of living, are of central importance to the poor, the Committee emphasizes that all civil and political rights, as well as the right to development, are also indispensable to those living in poverty.[7] Because of its mandate, expertise and experience, the Committee gives particular attention to the economic, social and cultural rights dimensions of anti-poverty strategies, but all rights are equally important as a means of ensuring that all people can live in freedom and dignity.

11. *Second*, non-discrimination and equality are integral elements of the international human rights normative framework, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Sometimes poverty arises when people have no access to existing resources because of who they are, what they believe or where they live. Discrimination may cause poverty, just as poverty may cause discrimination. Inequality may be entrenched in institutions and deeply rooted in social values that shape relationships within households and communities. Accordingly, the international norms of non-discrimination and equality, which demand that particular attention be given to vulnerable groups and individuals from such groups, have profound implications for anti-poverty strategies.

12. *Third*, the international human rights normative framework includes the right of those affected by key decisions to participate in the relevant decision-making processes. The right to participate is reflected in numerous international instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development.[8] In the Committee's experience, a policy or programme that is formulated without the active and informed participation of those affected is most unlikely to be effective. Although free and fair elections are a crucial component of the right to participate, they are not enough to ensure that those living in poverty enjoy the right to participate in key decisions affecting their lives.

13. In conclusion, anti-poverty policies are more likely to be effective, sustainable, inclusive, equitable and meaningful to those living in poverty if they are based upon international human rights. For this to occur, human rights need to be taken into account in all relevant policy-making processes.[9] Thus, there is a need for appropriately trained officials operating good processes that are informed by reliable, disaggregated data.

Obligations and accountability

14. The Covenant empowers the poor by granting them rights and imposing legal obligations on others, such as States. Critically, rights and obligations demand accountability: unless supported by a system of accountability, they can become no more than windowdressing. Accordingly, the human rights approach to poverty emphasizes obligations and requires that all duty-holders, including States and international organizations, are held to account for their conduct in relation to international human rights law. In its General Comment No. 9, the Committee remarks upon mechanisms of legal accountability for State parties. As for other duty-holders, they must determine which accountability mechanisms are most appropriate in their particular case. However, whatever the mechanisms of accountability, they must be accessible, transparent and effective.[10]

Core obligations: national and international responsibilities

15. According to the Covenant, the enumerated rights are subject to resource availability and may be realized progressively.[11] However, General Comment No. 3, adopted in 1990, confirms that State parties have a "core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights" enunciated in the Covenant. As the Committee observes, without such a core obligation, the Covenant "would be largely deprived of its raison d'être".[12]

16. More recently, the Committee began to identify the core obligations arising from the "minimum essential levels" of the rights to food, education and health,[13] and it confirmed that these core obligations are "non-derogable".[14] In General Comment No. 14, the Committee emphasizes that it is particularly incumbent on all those in a position to assist, to provide "international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical" to enable developing countries to fulfil their core obligations.[15] In short, core obligations give rise to national responsibilities for all States and international responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are "in a position to assist".

17. Thus, the core obligations of economic, social and cultural rights have a crucial role to play in national and international developmental policies, including anti-poverty strategies. When grouped together, the core obligations establish an international minimum threshold that all developmental policies should be designed to respect. In accordance with General Comment No. 14, it is particularly incumbent on all those who can assist, to help developing countries respect this international minimum threshold. If a national or international anti-poverty strategy does not reflect this minimum threshold, it is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party.

18. For the avoidance of any misunderstanding, the Committee wishes to emphasize three points. First, because core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of

conflict, emergency and natural disaster. Second, because poverty is a global phenomenon, core obligations have great relevance to some individuals and communities living in the richest States. Third, after a State party has ensured the core obligations of economic, social and cultural rights, it continues to have an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of all the rights in the Covenant.

Conclusion

19. The Committee strongly recommends the integration of international human rights norms into participatory, multi-sectoral national poverty eradication or reduction plans.[16] Such anti-poverty plans have an indispensable role to play in all States, no matter what their stage of economic development.

20. Non-State actors, including international organizations, national human rights institutions, civil society organizations and private businesses, also have heavy responsibilities in the struggle against poverty. Each should clearly identify how it can contribute to poverty eradication, keeping in mind the human rights dimensions of poverty as outlined in this statement.

21. The Committee is deeply aware that there are structural obstacles to the eradication of poverty in developing countries. Through its various activities, including the reporting process and the adoption of general comments, the Committee attempts to assist developing States by identifying measures that they can and should take to address these obstacles. However, some of the structural obstacles confronting developing States' anti-poverty strategies lie beyond their control in the contemporary international order. In the Committee's view, it is imperative that measures be urgently taken to remove these global structural obstacles, such as unsustainable foreign debt, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the absence of an equitable multilateral trade, investment and financial system. Otherwise, the national anti-poverty strategies of some States have limited chance of sustainable success. In this regard, the Committee notes article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the Declaration on the Right to Development, in particular article 3.3.[17]

22. So far as its resources and other responsibilities permit, the Committee continues to prepare additional general comments that clarify the normative content of economic, social and cultural rights, including their core obligations, and it invites all parties to assist in this important and challenging task.

23. Conscious of their far-reaching importance, the Committee confirms its willingness to discuss the issues identified in this statement with all those committed to the eradication of poverty.

Adopted on 4 May 2001

Notes

[1] The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the common Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasize the importance of "freedom from ... want".

[2] For example, see General Assembly resolution 55/106 of 4 December 2000 and Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/31 of 23 April 2001.

[3] The term "poverty" is not found in any of the major international human rights instruments. For a recent United Nations study of the links between human rights, development and poverty, see *Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development*, UNDP.

[4] World Bank, *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty*, Oxford University Press, p.v.

[5] For example, see Deepa Narayan, *Voices of the Poor, Can Anyone Hear Us?*, published by the Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000.

[6] According to chapter II, entitled "Eradication of poverty", in the Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development (1995): "Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterized by a lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life." (para. 19)

[7] Consistent with part I, paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights (1993): "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis."

[8] See article 13.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 2.3 of the Declaration on the Right to Development.

[9] See statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization, Seattle, 30 November-3 December 1999 (E/C.12/1999/9).

[10] For the Committee's remarks on the "Obligations of actors other than States parties" see, in particular, General Comment No. 13, part III and General Comment No. 14, part V; also General Comment No. 12, paras. 20 and 38-41.

[11] Article 2.1.

[12] General Comment No. 3, para. 10.

[13] General Comment Nos. 11, 13 and 14 respectively.

[14] General Comment No. 14, para. 47.

[15] General Comment No. 14, para. 45. The Covenant refers to "international assistance and cooperation", or similar formulations, in articles 2.1, 11.2, 15.4, 22 and 23.

[16] Such as those anticipated by the World Summit for Social Development (1995) and the more recent Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. For a recent examination of national poverty eradication plans see UNDP, *Poverty Report 2000: Overcoming Human Poverty*.

[17] Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." Article 3.3 of the Declaration on the Right to Development: "States have the duty to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development."

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session
Geneva, 13-31 August 2001

PROVISIONAL AGENDA AND ANNOTATIONS

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, established in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/17, will be held at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 13 to 31 August 2001. The first meeting will be convened on Monday, 13 August 2001, at 10 a.m.

2. The attached provisional agenda and annotations for the twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session of the Committee have been prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 4 of the rules of procedure of the Committee.

3. The attention of the States parties is drawn, in particular, to the annotations to item 6 containing the list of reports that will be before the Committee at its twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session.

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PROVISIONAL AGENDA

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Organization of work.

3. Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

4. Follow-up to the consideration of reports under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

5. Relations with United Nations organs and other treaty bodies.

6. Consideration of reports:

   (a) Reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant;

   (b) Reports submitted by specialized agencies in accordance with article 18 of the Covenant.

7. Submission of reports by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

8. Formulation of suggestions and recommendations of a general nature based on the consideration of reports submitted by States parties to the Covenant and by the specialized agencies.

9. Miscellaneous matters.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Adoption of the agenda

Under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the first item on the provisional agenda of any session shall be the adoption of the agenda, except for the election of its officers when required under rule 14. In accordance with rule 6 the Committee, during a session, may revise the agenda and may, as appropriate, add, delete or defer items.

2. Organization of work

In accordance with rule 8 of its rules of procedure, at the beginning of each session, the Committee shall consider appropriate organizational matters, including the schedule of its meetings. In this connection, the attention of the members of the Committee is drawn to the draft programme of work for the session, prepared by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairperson of the Committee and in accordance with established practice (E/C.12/2001/L.2).

3. Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The Committee decided at its fourteenth session (28 April-17 May 1996) that as from its fifteenth session its discussions relating to the implementation of the Covenant (NGO hearings, methods of work, consideration and adoption of General Comments, etc.) would be conducted under this agenda item. The Committee decided that its next day of general discussion, during its twenty-eighth session, will be devoted to the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (article 3 of the Covenant).

4. Follow-up to the consideration of reports under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant

At its fourteenth session, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, recognizing the importance of periodically reviewing the implementation by States parties of its suggestions and recommendations requested the Secretariat to submit to it, as from the fifteenth session, a document indicating all cases where a follow-up had been suggested by the Committee. In this connection, the attention of the members of the Committee is drawn to document E/C.12/2001/3 which contains the requested information. At its twenty-fifth session, the Committee decided to consider, at its twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session, the additional information submitted by Israel (E/1989/5/Add.14) under this agenda item.

5. Relations with United Nations organs and other treaty bodies

The Committee decided at its sixth session to nominate individual members to follow the work of each of the other treaty bodies. Such members are to follow as closely as possible the work of the relevant committees, to liaise where possible with members of these committees and to present an oral report on developments of both a procedural and substantive nature in their work which appeared to be of specific relevance to the work of the Committee (E/1992/23, paras. 371-373).

6. Consideration of reports

(a) Reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant

In accordance with rule 61, paragraph 2, of its rules of procedure, the Committee shall normally consider the reports submitted by States parties under article 16 of the Covenant in the order in which they have been received by the Secretary-General. Representatives of the reporting States are entitled to be present at the meetings of the Committee when their reports are examined; such representatives should be able to make statements on the reports submitted by their Governments and reply to questions which may be put to them by the members of the Committee.

At its twenty-fifth session, the Committee requested the Secretary-General to schedule seven reports from seven States parties for consideration at its twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session.

In accordance with rule 62, paragraph 2, of the Committee's rules of procedure, the Secretary-General has in a note verbale dated 15 May 2001 informed the States parties concerned of the opening date and duration of the twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session of the Committee, as well as of the dates at which their respective reports will be examined and has invited them to send representatives to attend the meetings of the Committee.

As at 15 May 2001, the reports listed below had been received by the Secretary-General. The reports of the States parties which are scheduled for consideration by the Committee at its twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session are identified by an asterisk. The tentative timetable for consideration of those reports, prepared by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairperson of the Committee, is contained in document E/C.12/2001/L.2.

Initial reports

Nepal*	E/1990/5/Add.45
Croatia	E/1990/5/Add.46
Czech Republic	E/1990/5/Add.47
Benin	E/1990/5/Add.48
Slovakia	E/1990/5/Add.49

Second periodic reports

Japan*	E/1990/6/Add.21
Panama*	E/1990/6/Add.24
Senegal*	E/1990/6/Add.25
Algeria	E/1990/6/Add.26
France	E/1990/6/Add.27
Jamaica	E/1990/6/Add.28
Ireland	E/1990/6/Add.29
Trinidad and Tobago	E/1990/6/Add.30

Third periodic reports

Syrian Arab Republic*	E/1994/104/Add.23

Fourth periodic reports

Ukraine*	E/C.12/4/Add.2
Germany*	E/C.12/4/Add.3
Sweden	E/C.12/4/Add.4
Colombia	E/C.12/4/Add.6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	E/C.12/4/Add.5, Add.7 and Add.8
Poland	E/C.12/4/Add.9

(b) Reports submitted by specialized agencies in accordance with article 18 of the Covenant

In accordance with rule 67 of its rules of procedure, the Committee is entrusted with the task of considering the reports submitted by specialized agencies pursuant to article 18 of the Covenant.

In accordance with rule 68 of the rules of procedure, the representatives of the specialized agencies concerned may make statements on matters falling within the scope of the activities of their respective organization in the course of the discussion by the Committee of the report of each State party to the Covenant. The representatives of the States parties presenting reports to the Committee shall be free to respond to, or take into account, the statements made by the specialized agencies. The Secretary-General has invited the following specialized agencies, United Nations organs and financial institutions to send representatives to attend the meetings of the Committee: International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO).

Any report which may be received from the specialized agencies under article 18 of the Covenant will be made available to the Committee in due course.

7. Submission of reports by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant

In accordance with rule 59, paragraph 1, of its rules of procedure, the Committee shall at each session consider the status of submission of reports under article 16 of the Covenant and

may make appropriate recommendations to the Council, including recommendations to the effect that the Secretary-General should send reminders to States parties from which reports have not been received.

The Committee will have before it under this item the following document:

A note by the Secretary-General on the States parties to the Covenant and the Status of submission of reports (E/C.12/12/2001/12).

8. **Formulation of suggestions and recommendations of a general nature based on the consideration of reports submitted by States parties to the Covenant and by the specialized agencies**

Pursuant to rule 64 of its rules of procedure, the Committee may wish to make suggestions and recommendations of a general nature on the basis of its consideration of reports submitted by States parties and the reports submitted by specialized agencies, in order to assist the Council to fulfil, in particular, its responsibilities under articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant. The Committee may also wish to make suggestions for consideration by the Council with reference to articles 19, 22 and 23 of the Covenant.

9. Miscellaneous matters

At its twenty-first session (1999), the Committee decided to inscribe on its agenda a standing item "Miscellaneous matters", under which it may consider any issue falling outside the scope of other standing agenda items.

UNITED NATIONS **E**

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
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Twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session
Geneva, 13-31 August 2001

STATES PARTIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND STATUS OF THE SUBMISSION OF REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROGRAMME ESTABLISHED BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL IN RESOLUTION 1988/4 AND RULE 58 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMITTEE

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entered into force on 3 January 1976, three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, as provided for in article 27 of the Covenant.

2. As at 15 May 2001 the Covenant had been ratified or acceded to by 145 States. A list of States parties as well as information on the status of the submission of reports by States parties, is to be found in the annex to the present document.

Annex I

STATES PARTIES TO THE COVENANT AND STATUS OF SUBMISSION OF REPORTS
(as of 15 May 2001)

A. Initial and second periodic reports

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
1. Afghanistan	24 April 1983	E/1990/5/Add.8 (E/C.12/1991/SR.2, 4-6 and 8)			Overdue		
2. Albania	4 January 1992	Overdue					
3. Algeria	12 December 1989	E/1990/5/Add.22 (E/C.12/1995/SR.46, 47 and 48)			E/1990/6/Add.26 (Pending consideration)		
4. Angola	10 April 1992	Overdue					
5. Argentina	8 November 1986	E/1990/5/Add.18 (E/C.12/1994/SR.31, 32, 35, 36 and 37)		E/1988/5/Add.4 E/1988/5/Add.8 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.18-20)	E/1990/6/Add.16 (E/C.12/1999/SR.33-36)		
6. Armenia	13 December 1993	E/1990/5/Add.36 (E/C.12/1999/SR.38-40)			Due on 30 June 2001		
7. Australia	10 March 1976	E/1978/8/Add.15 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.12-13)	E/1980/6/Add.22 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.18)	E/1982/3/Add.9 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.13-14	E/1984/7/Add.22 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.17, 18 and 21)	E/1986/4/Add.7 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.10, 11, 13 and 14)	E/1990/7/Add.13 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.13, 15 and 20)
8. Austria	10 December 1978	E/1984/6/Add.17 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.3-4)	E/1980/6/Add.19 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.8)	E/1982/3/Add.37 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.3)	E/1990/6/Add.5 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.39-41)	E/1986/4/Add.8 and Corr.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.4 and 7)	E/1990/6/Add.5 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.39-41)
9. Azerbaijan	13 November 1992	E/1990/5/Add.30 (E/C.12/1997/SR.39-41)			Overdue		
10. Bangladesh	5 January 1999	Due on 30 June 2001					
11. Barbados	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.33 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.3)	E/1980/6/Add.27 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.6-7)	E/1982/3/Add.24 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.14-15)	Overdue		
12. Belarus	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.19 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.16)	E/1980/6/Add.18 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.16)	E/1982/3/Add.3 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1984/7/Add.8 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.13-15)	E/1986/4/Add.19 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.10-12)	E/1990/7/Add.5 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.2, 3 and 12)
13. Belgium	21 July 1983	E/1990/5/Add.15 (E/C.12/1994/SR.15-17)			E/1990/6/Add.18 (E/C.12/2000/SR.64-66)		
14. Benin	12 June 1992	E/1990/5/Add.48			Received 5 February 2001		
15. Bolivia	12 November 1982	E/1990/5/Add.44 (E/C.12/2001/SR.15-17; E/C.12/1/Add.60)			Due on 30 June 2005		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
16. Bosnia and Herzegovina	6 March 1993	Overdue					
17. Brazil	24 April 1992	Overdue					
18. Bulgaria	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.24 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.12)	E/1980/6/Add.29 (E/1982/WG.1/SR.8)	E/1982/3/Add.23 (E/1983/WG.1/SR.11-13)	E/1984/7/Add.18 (E/1985/WG.1/SR.9 and 11)	E/1986/4/Add.20 (E/C.12/1988/SR.17-19)	
19. Burkina Faso	4 April 1999	Due on 30 June 2001					
20. Burundi	9 August 1990	Overdue					
21. Cambodia	26 August 1992	Overdue					
22. Cameroon	27 September 1984	E/1990/5/Add.35 (E/C.12/1999/SR.41-43)	E/1986/3/Add.8 (E/C.12/1989/SR.6-7)	E/1990/5/Add.35 (E/C.12/1999/SR.41-43)			
23. Canada	19 August 1976	E/1978/8/Add.32 (E/1982/WG.1/SR.1-2)	E/1980/6/Add.32 (E/1984/WG.1/SR.4 and 6)	E/1982/3/Add.34 (E/1986/WG.1/SR.13, 15 and 16)	E/1984/7/Add.28 (E/C.12/1989/SR.8 and 11)	E/1990/6/Add.3 (E/C.12/1993/SR.6, 7 and 18)	
24. Cape Verde	6 November 1993	Overdue					
25. Central African Republic	8 August 1981	Overdue					
26. Chad	9 September 1995	Overdue					
27. Chile	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.10 and 28 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.8-9)	E/1980/6/Add.4 (E/1981/WG.1/SR.7)	E/1982/3/Add.40 (E/C.12/1988/SR.12-13 and 16)	E/1984/7/Add.1 (E/1984/WG.1/SR.11-12)	E/1986/4/Add.18 (E/C.12/1988/SR.12-13 and 16)	Overdue
28. China	27 June 2001	Due on 30 June 2003					
29. Colombia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.17 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.15)	E/1986/3/Add.3 (E/1986/WG.1/SR.6 and 9)	E/1982/3/Add.36 (E/1986/WG.1/SR.15, 21 and 22)	E/1984/7/Add.21/Rev.1 (E/1986/WG.1/SR.22 and 25)	E/1986/4/Add.25 (E/C.12/1990/SR.12-14 and 17)	E/1990/7/Add.4 (E/C.12/1991/SR.17, 18 and 25)
30. Congo	5 January 1984	Overdue (without report: E/C.12/2000/SR.16 and 17)					
31. Costa Rica	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.3 (E/C.12/1990/SR.38, 40, 41 and 43)			Overdue		
32. Côte d'Ivoire	26 June 1992	Overdue					
33. Croatia	8 October 1991	E/1990/5/Add.46. Received 4 July 2000					
34. Cyprus	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.21 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.17)	E/1980/6/Add.3 (E/1981/WG.1/SR.6)	E/1982/3/Add.19 (E/1983/WG.1/SR.7-8)	E/1984/7/Add.13 (E/1984/WG.1/SR.18 and 22)	E/1986/4/Add.2 and 26 (E/C.12/1990/SR.2, 3 and 5)	

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
35. Czech Republic	1 January 1993	E/1990/5/Add.47. Received 30 August 2000					
36. Democratic People's Republic Of Korea	14 December 1981	E/1984/6/Add.7 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.21-22)	E/1986/3/Add.5 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.21-22)	E/1988/5/Add.6 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.6, 8 and 10)	Overdue		
37. Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 February 1977	E/1984/6/Add.18	E/1986/3/Add.7	E/1982/3/Add.41 (E/C.12/1988/SR.16-19)	Overdue		
38. Denmark	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.13 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1980/6/Add.15 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.12)	E/1982/3/Add.20 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.8-9)	E/1984/7/Add.11 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.17 and 21)	E/1986/4/Add.16 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.8-9)	
39. Dominica	17 September 1993	Overdue					
40. Dominican Republic	4 April 1978	E/1990/5/Add.4 (E/C.12/1990/SR.43-45 and 47)			E/1990/6/Add.7 (E/C.12/1996/SR.29 and 30) (E/C.12/1997/SR.29-31)		
41. Ecuador	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.1 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.4-5)	E/1986/3/Add.14 (E/C.12/1990/SR.37-39 and 42)	E/1988/5/Add.7	E/1984/7/Add.12 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.20 and 22)	Overdue	
42. Egypt	14 April 1982	E/1990/5/Add.38 (E/C.12/2000/SR.12, 13 and 14)					
43. El Salvador	29 February 1980	E/1990/5/Add.25 (E/C.12/1996/SR.15, 16 and 18)			Overdue		
44. Equatorial Guinea	25 December 1987	Overdue					
45. Eritrea	17 July 2001	Due on 30 June 2003					
46. Estonia	21 January 1992	Overdue					
47. Ethiopia	11 September 1993	Overdue					
48. Finland	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.14 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.6)	E/1980/6/Add.11 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1982/3/Add.28 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.7-8)	E/1984/7/Add.14 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.17-18)	E/1986/4/Add.4 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.8-9 and 11)	E/1990/7/Add.1 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.11, 12 and 16)
49. France	4 February 1981	E/1984/6/Add.11 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.18-19 and 21)	E/1986/3/Add.10 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.12-13)	E/1982/3/Add.30 and Corr.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.5 and 7)	E/1990/6/Add.27. Received 30 June 2000		
50. Gabon	21 April 1983	Overdue					
51. Gambia	29 March 1979	Overdue					
52. Georgia	3 August 1994	E/1990/5/Add.37 (E/C.12/2000/SR.3, 4 and 5)					

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
53. Germany	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.8 and Corr.1 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.8) E/1978/8/Add.11 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1980/6/Add.6 (E/1981/WG.1 SR.8) E/1980/6/Add.10 (E/1981/WG.1 SR.10)	E/1982/3/Add.15 and Corr.1 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.5-6) E/1982/3/Add.14 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.17-18)	E/1984/7/Add.3 and 23 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.12 and 16) E/1984/7/Add.24 and Corr.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.22-23 and 25)	E/1986/4/Add.11 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.11, 12 and 14) E/1986/4/Add.10 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.19-20)	E/1990/7/Add.12 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.35, 36 and 46)
54. Ghana	7 December 2000	Due on 30 June 2002					
55. Greece	16 August 1985	Overdue					
56. Grenada	6 December 1991	Overdue					
57. Guatemala	19 August 1988	E/1990/5/Add.24 (E/C.12/1996/SR.11-14)			Overdue		
58. Guinea	24 April 1978	Overdue					
59. Guinea-Bissau	2 October 1992	Overdue					
60. Guyana	15 May 1977	E/1990/5/Add.27 (Pending consideration)		E/1982/3/Add.5, 29 and 32 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.20 and 22 and E/1985/WG.1/ SR.6)			
61. Honduras	17 May 1981	E/1990/5/Add.40 (E/C.12/2001/SR.5-7; E/C.12/1/Add.57)			Due on 30 June 2006		
62. Hungary	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.7 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.7)	E/1980/6/Add.37 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.6-7 and 9)	E/1982/3/Add.10 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.14)	E/1984/7/Add.15 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.19 and 21)	E/1986/4/Add.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.6-7 and 9)	E/1990/7/Add.10 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.9, 12 and 21)
63. Iceland	22 November 1979	E/1990/5/Add.6 (E/C.12/1993/SR.29, 30, 31 and 46) E/1990/5/Add.14			E/1990/6/Add.15 (E/C.12/1999/SR.3-5)		
64. India	10 July 1979	E/1984/6/Add.13 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.20 and 24)	E/1980/6/Add.34 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.6 and 8)	E/1988/5/Add.5 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.16-17 and 19)	Overdue		
65. Iran (Islamic Republic of)	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.9 (E/C.12/1993/SR.7-9 and 20)		E/1982/3/Add.43 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.42, 43 and 45)	Overdue		
66. Iraq	3 January 1976	E/1984/6/Add.3 and 8 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.8 and 11)	E/1980/6/Add.14 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.12)	E/1982/3/Add.26 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.3-4)		E/1986/4/Add.3 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.8 and 11)	E/1990/7/Add.15 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.11 and 14)
67. Ireland	8 March 1990	E/1990/5/Add.34 (E/C.12/1999/SR.14-16)			E/1990/6/Add.29. Received 25 August 2000		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
68. Israel	3 January 1992	E/1990/5/Add.39 (E/C.12/1998/SR.31-33)			Overdue		
69. Italy	15 December 1978	E/1978/8/Add.34 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.3-4)	E/1980/6/Add.31 and 36 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.3 and 5)		E/1990/6/Add.2 (E/C.12/1992/SR.13, 14 and 21)		
70. Jamaica	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.27 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.20)	E/1986/3/Add.12 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.10-12 and 15)	E/1988/5/Add.3 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.10-12 and15)	E/1984/7/Add.30 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.10-12 and 15)	E/1990/6/Add.28. Received 16 August 2000	
71. Japan	21 September 1979	E/1984/6/Add.6 and Corr.1 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1986/3/Add.4 and Corr.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.20-21 and 23)	E/1982/3/Add.7 (E/1982/WG.1 SR.12-13)	E/1990/6/Add.21 (Pending consideration)		
72. Jordan	3 January 1976	E/1984/6/Add.15 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.6-8)	E/1986/3/Add.6 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.8)	E/1982/3/Add.38/ Rev.1 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.30-32)	E/1990/6/Add.17 (E/C.12/2000/SR.30-31; E/C/12/1/Add.46)		
73. Kenya	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.18			Overdue		
74. Kuwait	31 August 1996	Overdue					
75. Kyrgyzstan	7 January 1995	E/1990/5/Add.42 (E/C.12/2000/SR.42-44; E/C.12/1/Add.49)					
76. Latvia	14 July 1992	Overdue					
77. Lebanon	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.16 (E/C.12/1993/SR.14, 16 and 21)			Overdue		
78. Lesotho	9 December 1992	Overdue					
79. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.26 (E/C.12/1997/SR.20-21)		E/1982/3/Add.6 and 25 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.16-17)	Overdue		
80. Liechtenstein	10 March 1999	Due on 30 June 2001					
81. Lithuania	20 February 1992	Overdue					
82. Luxembourg	18 November 1983	E/1990/5/Add.1 (E/C.12/1990/SR.33-36)			E/1990/6/Add.9 (E/C.12/1997/SR.48 and 49)		
83. Madagascar	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.29 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.2)	E/1980/6/Add.39 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.2-3 and 5)	Overdue	E/1984/7/Add.19 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.14 and 18)	Overdue	
84. Malawi	22 March 1994	Overdue					
85. Mali	3 January 1976	Overdue					
86. Malta	13 December 1990	Overdue					
87. Mauritius	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.21 (E/C.12/1995/SR.40, 41 and 43)			Overdue		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
88. Mexico	23 June 1981	E/1984/6/Add.2 and 10 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.24, 26 and 28)	E/1986/3/Add.13 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.6, 7 and 9)	E/1982/3/Add.8 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/6/Add.4 (E/C.12/1993/SR.32-35 and 49)		
89. Moldova	26 March 1993	Overdue					
90. Monaco	28 November 1997	Overdue					
91. Mongolia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.6 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.7)	E/1980/6/Add.7 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.8-9)	E/1982/3/Add.11 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.15-16)	E/1984/7/Add.6 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.16 and 18)	E/1986/4/Add.9 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.5 and 7)	
92. Morocco	3 August 1979	E/1990/5/Add.13 (E/C.12/1994/SR.8-10)			E/1990/6/Add.20 (E/C.12/2000/SR.70-72)		
93. Namibia	28 February 1995	Overdue					
94. Nepal	14 August 1991	E/1990/5/Add.45 (Pending consideration)					
95. Netherlands	11 March 1979	E/1984/6/Add.14 and 20 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.5-6) (E/C.12/1989/ SR.14-15)	E/1980/6/Add.33 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.4-6 and 8)	E/1982/3/Add.35 and 44 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.14 and 18) (E/C.12/1989/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/6/Add.11 E/1990/6/Add.12 (E/C.12/1998/ SR.13-17)	E/1986/4/Add.24 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/6/Add.13 (E/C.12/1998/ SR.13-17)
96. New Zealand	28 March 1979	E/1990/5/Add.5, E/1990/5/Add.11 and E/1990/5/Add.12 (E/C.12/1993/SR.24, 25, 26 and 40)			Overdue		
97. Nicaragua	12 June 1980	E/1984/6/Add.9 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.16-17 and 19)	E/1986/3/Add.15 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.27, 28 and 46)	E/1982/3/Add.31 and Corr.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.15)	Overdue		
98. Niger	7 June 1986	Overdue					
99. Nigeria	29 October 1993	E/1990/5/Add.31 (E/C.12/1998/SR.6-9)			Due on 30 June 2000		
100. Norway	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.12 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.5)	E/1980/6/Add.5 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.14)	E/1982/3/Add.12 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.16)	E/1984/7/Add.16 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.19 and 22)	E/1986/4/Add.21 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/7/Add.7 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.4, 5 and 12)
101. Panama	8 June 1977	E/1984/6/Add.19 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.3, 5 and 8)	E/1980/6/Add.20 and 23 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.5)	E/1988/5/Add.9 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.3, 5 and 8)	E/1990/6/Add.24 (Pending consideration)	E/1986/4/Add.22 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.3, 5 and 8)	E/1990/6/Add.24 (Pending consideration)
102. Paraguay	10 September 1992	E/1990/5/Add.23 (E/C.12/1996/SR.1, 2 and 4)			Overdue		
103. Peru	28 July 1978	E/1984/6/Add.5 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.11 and 18)	E/1990/5/Add.29 (E/C.12/1997/SR.15-17)		Overdue		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
104. Philippines	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.4 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.11)	E/1986/3/Add.17 (E/C.12/1995/ SR.11, 12 and 14)	E/1988/5/Add.2 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.8-9 and 11)	E/1984/7/Add.4 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.15 and 20)	Overdue	
105. Poland	18 June 1977	E/1978/8/Add.23 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.18-19)	E/1980/6/Add.12 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.11)	E/1982/3/Add.21 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1984/7/Add.26 and 27 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.25-27)	E/1986/4/Add.12 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.5-6)	E/1990/7/Add.9 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.6, 7 and 15)
106. Portugal	31 October 1978		E/1980/6/Add.35/ Rev.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.2 and 4)	E/1982/3/Add.27/ Rev.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.6 and 9)	E/1990/6/Add.6 (E/C.12/1995/SR.7, 8 and 10) E/1990/6/Add.8 (Macau) (E/C.12/1996/SR.31-33)		
107. Republic of Korea	10 July 1990	E/1990/5/Add.19 (E/C.12/1995/SR.3, 4 and 6)			E/1990/6/Add.23 (E/C.12/1/Add.12-14; E/C.12/1/Add.59)		
108. Romania	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.20 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.16-17)	E/1980/6/Add.1 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.5)	E/1982/3/Add.13 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.17-18)	E/1984/7/Add.17 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.10 and 13)	E/1986/4/Add.17 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.6)	E/1990/7/Add.14 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.5, 7 and 13)
109. Russian Federation	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.16 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.14)	E/1980/6/Add.17 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.14-15)	E/1982/3/Add.1 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.11-12)	E/1984/7/Add.7 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1986/4/Add.14 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.16-18)	E/1990/7/Add.8 (withdrawn)
110. Rwanda	3 January 1976	E/1984/6/Add.4 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.10 and 12)	E/1986/3/Add.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.16 and 19)	E/1982/3/Add.42 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.10-12)	E/1984/7/Add.29 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.10-12)	Overdue	
111. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	9 February 1982	Overdue					
112. San Marino	18 January 1986	Overdue					
113. Senegal	13 May 1978	E/1984/6/Add.22 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.37, 38 and 49)	E/1980/6/Add.13/ Rev.1 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.11)	E/1982/3/Add.17 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.14-16)	E/1990/6/Add.25 (Pending consideration)		
114. Seychelles	5 August 1982	Overdue					
115. Sierra Leone	23 November 1996	Overdue					
116. Slovakia	28 May 1993	E/1990/5/Add.49. Received 2 March 2001					
117. Slovenia	6 July 1992	Overdue					
118. Solomon Islands	17 March 1982	Overdue (without report: E/C.12/1999/SR.9; E/C.12/1/Add.33)					
119. Somalia	24 April 1990	Overdue					

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
120. Spain	27 July 1977	E/1978/8/Add.26 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.20)	E/1980/6/Add.28 (E/1982/WG.1/SR.7)	E/1982/3/Add.22 (E/1983/WG.1/SR.10-11)	E/1984/7/Add.2 (E/1984/WG.1/SR.12 and 14)	E/1986/4/Add.6 (E/1986/WG.1/SR.10 and 13)	E/1990/7/Add.3 (E/C.12/1991/SR.13, 14, 16 and 22)
121. Sri Lanka	11 September 1980	E/1990/5/Add.32 (E/C.12/1998/SR.3-5)					
122. Sudan	18 June 1986	E/1990/5/Add.41 (E/C.12/2000/SR.38-41; E/C.12/1/Add.48)			Due 30 June 2003		
123. Suriname	28 March 1977	E/1990/5/Add.20 (E/C.12/1995/SR.13, 15 and 16)			Overdue		
124. Sweden	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.5 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.15)	E/1980/6/Add.8 (E/1981/WG.1/SR.9)	E/1982/3/Add.2 (E/1982/WG.1/SR.19-20)	E/1984/7/Add.5 (E/1984/WG.1/SR.14 and 16)	E/1986/4/Add.13 (E/C.12/1988/SR.10-11)	E/1990/7/Add.2 (E/C.12/1991/SR.11-13 and 18)
125. Switzerland	18 September 1992	E/1990/5/Add.33 (E/C.12/1998/SR.37-39)			Overdue		
126. Syrian Arab Republic	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.25 and 31 (E/1983/WG.1/SR.2)	E/1980/6/Add.9 (E/1981/WG.1/SR.4)		E/1990/6/Add.1 (E/C.12/1991/SR.7, 9 and 11)		
127. Tajikistan	4 April 1999	Due on 30 June 2001					
128. Thailand	5 December 1999	Due on 30 June 2002					
129. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	17 September 1991	Overdue					
130. Togo	24 August 1984	Overdue (without report: E/C.12/2001/SR.19; E/C.12/1/Add.61)					
131. Trinidad and Tobago	8 March 1979	E/1984/6/Add.21	E/1986/3/Add.11	E/1988/5/Add.1 (E/C.12/1989/SR.17-19)	E/1990/6/Add.30. Received 28 September 2000		
132. Tunisia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.3 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.5-6)	E/1986/3/Add.9 (E/C.12/1989/SR.9)		E/1990/6/Add.14 (E/C.12/1999/SR.17-19)		
133. Turkmenistan	1 August 1997	Overdue					
134. Uganda	21 April 1987	Overdue					
135. Ukraine	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.22 (E/1980/WG.1/SR.18)	E/1980/6/Add.24 (E/1982/WG.1/SR.5-6)	E/1982/3/Add.4 (E/1982/WG.1/SR.11-12)	E/1984/7/Add.9 (E/1984/WG.1/SR.13-15)	E/1986/4/Add.5 (E/C.12/1987/SR.9-11)	E/1990/7/Add.11 (withdrawn)

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
136. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20 August 1976	E/1978/8/Add.9 and 30 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.19 and E/1982/WG.1/ SR.1)	E/1980/6/Add.16 and Corr.1, Add.25 and Corr.1 and Add.26 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.16-17)	E/1982/3/Add.16 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.19-21)	E/1984/7/Add.20 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.14 and 17)	E/1986/4/Add.23 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.16-17) E/1986/4/Add.27 E/1986/4/28 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.33-37)	E/1990/7/Add.16 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.33-37)
137. United Republic of Tanzania	11 September 1976	Overdue	E/1980/6/Add.2 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.5)	Overdue			
138. Uruguay	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.7 (E/C.12/1994/SR.3, 4, 6 and 13)			E/1990/6/Add.10 (E/C.12/1997/SR.42-44)		
139. Uzbekistan	28 December 1995	Overdue					
140. Venezuela	10 August 1978	E/1984/6/Add.1 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.7, 8 and 10)	E/1980/6/Add.38 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.2 and 5)	E/1982/3/Add.33 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.12, 17 and 18)	E/1990/6/Add.10 (E/C.12/2001/SR.3-5; E/C.12/1/Add.56)		
141. Viet Nam	24 December 1982	E/1990/5/Add.10 (E/C.12/1993/SR.9-11 and 19)			Overdue		
142. Yemen	9 May 1987	Overdue					
143. Yugoslavia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.35 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.4 and 5)	E/1980/6/Add.30 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.3)	E/1982/3/Add.39 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.14-15)	E/1984/7/Add.10 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.16 and 18)	E/1990/6/Add.22 (Withdrawn)	
144. Zambia	10 July 1984	Overdue	E/1986/3/Add.2 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.4, 5 and 7)	Overdue			
145. Zimbabwe	13 August 1991	E/1990/5/Add.28 (E/C.12/1997/SR.8-10 and 14)			Overdue		

Annex I *(continued)*

STATES PARTIES TO THE COVENANT AND STATUS OF SUBMISSION OF REPORTS
(as of 15 May 2001)

B. Third and fourth periodic reports

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
1. Afghanistan	24 April 1983		
2. Albania	4 January 1992		
3. Algeria	12 December 1989		
4. Angola	10 April 1992		
5. Argentina	8 November 1986		
6. Armenia	13 December 1993		
7. Australia	10 March 1976	E/1994/104/Add.22 (E/C.12/2000/SR.45-47; E/C.12/1/Add.50)	Due 30 June 2005
8. Austria	10 December 1978	Was due 30 June 1997	
9. Azerbaijan	13 November 1992		
10. Bangladesh	5 January 1999		
11. Barbados	3 January 1976		
12. Belarus	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.6 (E/C.12/1996/SR.34-36)	Was due 30 June 1999
13. Belgium	21 July 1983		
14. Benin	12 June 1992		
15. Bolivia	12 November 1982		
16. Bosnia and Herzegovina	6 March 1993		
17. Brazil	24 April 1992		
18. Bulgaria	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.16 (E/C.12/1999/SR.30-32)	Due 30 June 2001
19. Burkina Faso	4 April 1999		
20. Burundi	9 August 1990		
21. Cambodia	26 August 1992		
22. Cameroon	27 September 1984		
23. Canada	19 August 1976	E/1994/104/Add.17 (E/C.12/1998/SR.46-48)	Was due 30 June 2000
24. Cape Verde	6 November 1993		
25. Central African Republic	8 August 1981		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
26. Chad	9 September 1995		
27. Chile	3 January 1976	Was due 30 June 1994	
28. China	27 June 2001		
29. Colombia	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.2 (E/C.12/1995/SR.32-35)	E/C.12/4/Add.5. Received 9 May 2000
30. Congo	5 January 1984		
31. Costa Rica	3 January 1976		
32. Côte d'Ivoire	26 June 1992		
33. Croatia	8 October 1991		
34. Cyprus	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.12 (E/C.12/1998/SR.34-36)	Was due 30 June 1999
35. Czech Republic	1 January 1993		
36. Democratic People's Republic of Korea	14 December 1981		
37. Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 February 1977		
38. Denmark*	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.15 (E/C.12/1999/SR.11-13)	Was due 30 June 1999
39. Dominica	17 September 1993		
40. Dominican Republic	4 April 1978	Was due 30 June 1999	
41. Ecuador	3 January 1976		
42. Egypt	14 April 1982		
43. El Salvador	29 February 1980		
44. Equatorial Guinea	25 December 1987		
45. Eritrea	17 July 2001		
46. Estonia	21 January 1992		
47. Ethiopia	11 September 1993		
48. Finland	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.7 (E/C.12/1996/SR.37-40)	E/C.12/4/Add.1 (E/C.12/2000/SR.61-63)
49. France	4 February 1981		
50. Gabon	21 April 1983		
51. Gambia	29 March 1979		
52. Georgia	3 August 1994		
53. Germany	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.14 (E/C.12/1998/SR.40-42)	E/C.12/4/Add.3. Received 17 January 2000
54. Ghana	7 December 2000		
55. Greece	16 August 1985		
56. Grenada	6 December 1991		
57. Guatemala	19 August 1988		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
58. Guinea	24 April 1978		
59. Guinea-Bissau	2 October 1992		
60. Guyana	15 May 1977		
61. Honduras	17 May 1981		
62. Hungary	3 January 1976	Was due 30 June 1994	
63. Iceland	22 November 1979		
64. India	10 July 1979		
65. Iran (Islamic Republic of)	3 January 1976		
66. Iraq	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.9 (E/C.12/1997/SR.33-35)	Was due 30 June 2000
67. Ireland	8 March 1990		
68. Israel	3 January 1992		
69. Italy	15 December 1978	E/1994/104/Add.19 (E/C.12/2000/SR.6, 7 and 8; E/C.12/1/Add.43)	
70. Jamaica	3 January 1976		
71. Japan	21 September 1979		
72. Jordan	3 January 1976	Due 30 June 2003	
73. Kenya	3 January 1976		
74. Kuwait	31 August 1996		
75. Kyrgyzstan	7 January 1995		
76. Latvia	14 July 1992		
77. Lebanon	3 January 1976		
78. Lesotho	9 December 1992		
79. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3 January 1976		
80. Liechtenstein	10 March 1999		
81. Lithuania	20 February 1992		
82. Luxembourg	18 November 1983	Was due 30 June 1998	
83. Madagascar	3 January 1976		
84. Malawi	22 March 1994		
85. Mali	3 January 1976		
86. Malta	13 December 1990		
87. Mauritius	3 January 1976		
88. Mexico	23 June 1981	E/1994/104/Add.18 (E/C.12/1999/SR.44-46)	
89. Moldova	26 March 1993		
90. Monaco	28 November 1997		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
91. Mongolia	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.21 (E/C.12/2000/SR.34-36; E/C.12/1/Add.47)	
92. Morocco	3 August 1979		
93. Namibia	28 February 1995		
94. Nepal	14 August 1991		
95. Netherlands	11 March 1979	Was due 30 June 1997	
96. New Zealand	28 March 1979		
97. Nicaragua	12 June 1980		
98. Niger	7 June 1986		
99. Nigeria	29 October 1993		
100. Norway	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.3 (E/C.12/1995/SR.34-37)	Was due 30 June 1999
101. Panama	8 June 1977		
102. Paraguay	10 September 1992		
103. Peru	28 July 1978		
104. Philippines	3 January 1976		
105. Poland	18 June 1977	E/1994/104/Add.13 (E/C.12/1998/SR.10-12)	Was due 30 June 1999
106. Portugal	31 October 1978	E/1994/104/Add.20 (E/C.12//2000/SR.58-60)	
107. Republic of Korea	10 July 1990	Due on 30 June 2006	
108. Romania	3 January 1976	Was due 30 June 1994	
109. Russian Federation	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.8 (E/C.12/1997/SR.11-14)	Was due 30 June 1999
110. Rwanda	3 January 1976		
111. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	9 February 1982		
112. San Marino	18 January 1986		
113. Senegal	13 May 1978		
114. Seychelles	5 August 1982		
115. Sierra Leone	23 November 1996		
116. Slovakia	28 May 1993		
117. Slovenia	6 July 1992		
118. Solomon Islands	17 March 1982		
119. Somalia	24 April 1990		
120. Spain	27 July 1977	E/1994/104/Add.5 (E/C.12/1996/SR.3-7)	Was due 30 June 1999
121. Sri Lanka	11 September 1980		
122. Sudan	18 June 1986		
123. Suriname	28 March 1977		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
124. Sweden	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.1 (E/C.12/1995/SR.13, 15 and 16)	E/C.12/4/Add.4. Received 10 April 2000
125. Switzerland	18 September 1992		
126. Syrian Arab Republic	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.23. Received 22 March 1999	
127. Tajikistan	4 April 1999		
128. Thailand	5 December 1999		
129. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	17 September 1991		
130. Togo	24 August 1984		
131. Trinidad and Tobago	8 March 1979		
132. Tunisia	3 January 1976		
133. Turkmenistan	1 August 1997		
134. Uganda	21 April 1987		
135. Ukraine	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.4 (E/C.12/1995/SR.42, 44 and 45)	E/C.12/4/Add.2. Received 13 August 1999
136. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20 August 1976	E/1994/104/Add.10 (Hong Kong) (E/C.12/1996/SR.39, 41, 42 and 44) E/1994/104/Add.11 (E/C.12/1997/SR.36-38) (E/1994/104/Add.24 (dependent territories) Received 13 April 2000)	E/C.12/4/Add.5 (overseas territories) Received 13 April 2000 E/C.12/4/Add.8. Received 30 January 2001
137. United Republic of Tanzania	11 September 1976		
138. Uruguay	3 January 1976		
139. Uzbekistan	28 December 1995		
140. Venezuela	10 August 1978	Due on 30 June 2006	
141. Viet Nam	24 December 1982		
142. Yemen	9 May 1987		
143. Yugoslavia	3 January 1976		
144. Zambia	10 July 1984		
145. Zimbabwe	13 August 1991		

* Fourth periodic report was due on 30 June 1999. At the request of the Government of Denmark, the Committee, at its twenty-first session (1999), decided to extend the deadline for the submission of the fourth periodic report to 30 June 2001.

UNITED
NATIONS

E

Economic and Social
Council

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24 September 2001

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Twenty-seventh session
Geneva, 12-30 November 2001

PROVISIONAL AGENDA AND ANNOTATIONS

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The twenty-seventh session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, established in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/17, will be held at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 12 to 30 November 2001. The first meeting will be convened on Monday, 12 November 2001, at 10 a.m.

2. The attached provisional agenda and annotations for the twenty-seventh session of the Committee have been prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 4 of the rules of procedure of the Committee.

3. The attention of the States parties is drawn, in particular, to the annotations to item 6 containing the list of reports that will be before the Committee at its twenty-seventh session.

GE.01-44781 (E) 270901

PROVISIONAL AGENDA

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Organization of work.

3. Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

4. Follow-up to the consideration of reports under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

5. Relations with United Nations organs and other treaty bodies.

6. Consideration of reports:

   (a) Reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant;

   (b) Reports submitted by specialized agencies in accordance with article 18 of the Covenant.

7. Submission of reports by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

8. Formulation of suggestions and recommendations of a general nature based on the consideration of reports submitted by States parties to the Covenant and by the specialized agencies.

9. Adoption of the report.

10. Miscellaneous matters.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Adoption of the agenda

Under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the first item on the provisional agenda of any session shall be the adoption of the agenda, except for the election of its officers when required under rule 14. In accordance with rule 6 the Committee, during a session, may revise the agenda and may, as appropriate, add, delete or defer items.

2. Organization of work

In accordance with rule 8 of its rules of procedure, at the beginning of each session, the Committee shall consider appropriate organizational matters, including the schedule of its meetings. In this connection, the attention of the members of the Committee is drawn to the draft programme of work for the session, prepared by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairperson of the Committee and in accordance with established practice (E/C.12/2001/L.3).

3. Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The Committee decided at its fourteenth session (28 April-17 May 1996) that as from its fifteenth session its discussions relating to the implementation of the Covenant (NGO hearings, methods of work, consideration and adoption of general comments, etc.) would be conducted under this agenda item. The Committee decided that its next day of general discussion, during its twenty-eighth session, will be devoted to the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (article 3 of the Covenant). At its twenty-seventh session, under this agenda item, the Committee, will discuss follow-up to its day of general discussion on article 15 (1) (e). It will also hold a joint meeting with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on follow-up to the Committee's day of general discussion on the right to education and follow-up to the World Education Forum held in Dakar in April 2000. It will further discuss follow-up to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, as well as follow-up to the 1996 round table on "Human Rights Approaches to Women's Health with a Focus on Reproductive and Sexual Heath and Rights" ("Glen Cove + 5") organized by the United Nations Population Fund, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women of the Secretariat.

4. Follow-up to the consideration of reports under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant

At its fourteenth session, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, recognizing the importance of periodically reviewing the implementation by States parties of its suggestions and recommendations requested the Secretariat to submit to it, as from the fifteenth session, a document indicating all cases where a follow-up had been suggested by the Committee. In this connection, the attention of the members of the Committee is drawn to document E/C.12/2001/3 which contains the requested information.

5. Relations with United Nations organs and other treaty bodies

The Committee decided at its sixth session to nominate individual members to follow the work of each of the other treaty bodies. Such members are to follow as closely as possible the work of the relevant committees, to liase where possible with members of these committees and to present an oral report on developments of both a procedural and substantive nature in their work which appeared to be of specific relevance to the work of the Committee (E/1992/23, paras. 371-373).

6. Consideration of reports

(a) Reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant

In accordance with rule 61, paragraph 2, of its rules of procedure, the Committee shall normally consider the reports submitted by States parties under article 16 of the Covenant in the order in which they have been received by the Secretary-General. Representatives of the reporting States are entitled to be present at the meetings of the Committee when their reports are examined; such representatives should be able to make statements on the reports submitted by their Governments and reply to questions which may be put to them by the members of the Committee.

At its twenty-sixth (extraordinary) session, the Committee requested the Secretary-General to schedule six reports from six States parties for consideration at its twenty-seventh session.

In accordance with rule 62, paragraph 2, of the Committee's rules of procedure, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 23 May 2001, informed the States parties concerned of the opening date and duration of the twenty-seventh session of the Committee, as well as of the dates at which their respective reports will be examined and has invited them to send representatives to attend the meetings of the Committee.

As at 5 September 2001, the reports listed below had been received by the Secretary-General. The reports of the States parties which are scheduled for consideration by the Committee at its twenty-seventh session are identified by an asterisk. The tentative timetable for consideration of those reports, prepared by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairperson of the Committee, is contained in document E/C.12/2001/L.3.

Initial reports

Croatia*	E/1990/5/Add.46
Czech Republic	E/1990/5/Add.47
Benin	E/1990/5/Add.48
Slovakia	E/1990/5/Add.49
Solomon Islands	E/1990/5/Add.50
Estonia	E/1990/5/Add 51
Republic of Moldova	E/1990/5/Add.52
Brazil	E/1990/5/Add.53

Second periodic reports

Algeria*	E/1990/6/Add.26
France*	E/1990/6/Add.27
Jamaica*	E/1990/6/Add.28
Ireland	E/1990/6/Add.29
Trinidad and Tobago	E/1990/6/Add.30
Georgia	E/1990/6/Add.31
Israel	E/1990/6/Add.32

Third periodic reports

Luxembourg	E/1994/104/Add.24

Fourth periodic reports

Sweden*	E/C.12/4/Add.4
Colombia*	E/C.12/4/Add.6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	E/C.12/4/Add.5, Add.7 and Add.8
Poland	E/C.12/4/Add.9

(b) Reports submitted by specialized agencies in accordance with article 18 of the Covenant

In accordance with rule 67 of its rules of procedure, the Committee is entrusted with the task of considering the reports submitted by specialized agencies pursuant to article 18 of the Covenant.

In accordance with rule 68 of the rules of procedure, the representatives of the specialized agencies concerned may make statements on matters falling within the scope of the activities of their respective organization in the course of the discussion by the Committee of the report of each State party to the Covenant. The representatives of the States parties presenting reports to the Committee shall be free to respond to, or take into account, the statements made by the specialized agencies. The Secretary-General has invited the following specialized agencies,

United Nations organs and financial institutions to send representatives to attend the meetings of the Committee: International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO).

Any report which may be received from the specialized agencies under article 18 of the Covenant will be made available to the Committee in due course.

7. Submission of reports by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant

In accordance with rule 59, paragraph 1, of its rules of procedure, the Committee shall at each session consider the status of submission of reports under article 16 of the Covenant and may make appropriate recommendations to the Council, including recommendations to the effect that the Secretary-General should send reminders to States parties from which reports have not been received.

The Committee will have before it under this item the following document:

A note by the Secretary-General on the States parties to the Covenant and the Status of submission of reports (E/C.12/12/2001/14).

8. Formulation of suggestions and recommendations of a general nature based on the consideration of reports submitted by States parties to the Covenant and by the specialized agencies

Pursuant to rule 64 of its rules of procedure, the Committee may wish to make suggestions and recommendations of a general nature on the basis of its consideration of reports submitted by States parties and the reports submitted by specialized agencies, in order to assist the Council to fulfil, in particular, its responsibilities under articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant. The Committee may also wish to make suggestions for consideration by the Council with reference to articles 19, 22 and 23 of the Covenant.

9. Adoption of the report

The Committee will adopt the report on its twenty-fifty (23 April-11 May 2001), twenty sixth (extraordinary) (13-31 August 2001) and twenty-seventh sessions (12-30 November 2001) to be submitted to the Economic and Social Council.

10. Miscellaneous matters

At its twenty-first session (1999), the Committee decided to inscribe on its agenda a standing item "Miscellaneous matters", under which it may consider any issue falling outside the scope of other standing agenda items.

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AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Twenty-seventh session
Geneva, 12-30 November 2001

STATES PARTIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND STATUS OF THE SUBMISSION OF REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROGRAMME ESTABLISHED BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL IN RESOLUTION 1988/4 AND RULE 58 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMITTEE

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entered into force on 3 January 1976, three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, as provided for in article 27 of the Covenant.

2. As at 3 September 2001 the Covenant had been ratified or acceded to by 145 States. A list of States parties as well as information on the status of the submission of reports by States parties, is to be found in the annex to the present document.

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Annex I

STATES PARTIES TO THE COVENANT AND STATUS OF SUBMISSION OF REPORTS
(as of 3 September 2001)

A. Initial and second periodic reports

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
1. Afghanistan	24 April 1983	*(Summary records of consideration of reports)*					
2. Albania	4 January 1992	E/1990/5/Add.8 (E/C.12/1991/SR.2, 4-6 and 8)			Overdue		
3. Algeria	12 December 1989	Overdue					
4. Angola	10 April 1992	E/1990/5/Add.22 (E/C.12/1995/SR.46, 47 and 48)			E/1990/6/Add.26 (Pending consideration)		
5. Argentina	8 November 1986	E/1990/5/Add.18 (E/C.12/1994/SR.31, 32, 35, 36 and 37)		E/1988/5/Add.4 E/1988/5/Add.8 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.18-20)	E/1990/6/Add.16 (E/C.12/1999/SR.33-36)		
6. Armenia	13 December 1993	E/1990/5/Add.36 (E/C.12/1999/SR.38-40)			Was due on 30 June 2001		
7. Australia	10 March 1976	E/1978/8/Add.15 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.12-13)	E/1980/6/Add.22 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.18)	E/1982/3/Add.9 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.13-14	E/1984/7/Add.22 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.17, 18 and 21)	E/1986/4/Add.7 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.10, 11, 13 and 14)	E/1990/7/Add.13 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.13, 15 and 20)
8. Austria	10 December 1978	E/1984/6/Add.17 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.3-4)	E/1980/6/Add.19 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.8)	E/1982/3/Add.37 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.3)	E/1990/6/Add.5 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.39-41)	E/1986/4/Add.8 and Corr.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.4 and 7)	E/1990/6/Add.5 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.39-41)
9. Azerbaijan	13 November 1992	E/1990/5/Add.30 (E/C.12/1997/SR.39-41)			Overdue		
10. Bangladesh	5 January 1999	Was due on 30 June 2001					
11. Barbados	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.33 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.3)	E/1980/6/Add.27 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.6-7)	E/1982/3/Add.24 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.14-15)	Overdue		
12. Belarus	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.19 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.16)	E/1980/6/Add.18 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.16)	E/1982/3/Add.3 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1984/7/Add.8 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.13-15)	E/1986/4/Add.19 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.10-12)	E/1990/7/Add.5 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.2, 3 and 12)
13. Belgium	21 July 1983	E/1990/5/Add.15 (E/C.12/1994/SR.15-17)			E/1990/6/Add.18 (E/C.12/2000/SR.64-66)		
14. Benin	12 June 1992	E/1990/5/Add.48			Received 5 February 2001		
15. Bolivia	12 November 1982	E/1990/5/Add.44 (E/C.12/2001/SR.15-17; E/C.12/1/Add.60)			Due on 30 June 2005		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
16. Bosnia and Herzegovina	6 March 1993	Overdue					
17. Brazil	24 April 1992	E/1990/5/Add.53. Received 21 August 2001					
18. Bulgaria	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.24 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.12)	E/1980/6/Add.29 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.8)	E/1982/3/Add.23 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.11-13)	E/1984/7/Add.18 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.9 and 11)	E/1986/4/Add.20 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.17-19)	
19. Burkina Faso	4 April 1999	Was due on 30 June 2001					
20. Burundi	9 August 1990	Overdue					
21. Cambodia	26 August 1992	Overdue					
22. Cameroon	27 September 1984	E/1990/5/Add.35 (E/C.12/1999/ SR.41-43)	E/1986/3/Add.8 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.6-7)	E/1990/5/Add.35 (E/C.12/1999/ SR.41-43)			
23. Canada	19 August 1976	E/1978/8/Add.32 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.1-2)	E/1980/6/Add.32 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.4 and 6)	E/1982/3/Add.34 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.13, 15 and 16)	E/1984/7/Add.28 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.8 and 11)	E/1990/6/Add.3 (E/C.12/1993/SR.6, 7 and 18)	
24. Cape Verde	6 November 1993	Overdue					
25. Central African Republic	8 August 1981	Overdue					
26. Chad	9 September 1995	Overdue					
27. Chile	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.10 and 28 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.8-9)	E/1980/6/Add.4 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.7)	E/1982/3/Add.40 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.12-13 and 16)	E/1984/7/Add.1 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.11-12)	E/1986/4/Add.18 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.12-13 and 16)	Overdue
28. China	27 June 2001	Due on 30 June 2003					
29. Colombia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.17 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.15)	E/1986/3/Add.3 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.6 and 9)	E/1982/3/Add.36 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.15, 21 and 22)	E/1984/7/Add.21/ Rev.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.22 and 25)	E/1986/4/Add.25 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.12-14 and 17)	E/1990/7/Add.4 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.17, 18 and 25)
30. Congo	5 January 1984	Overdue (without report: E/C.12/2000/SR.16 and 17)					
31. Costa Rica	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.3 (E/C.12/1990/SR.38, 40, 41 and 43)			Overdue		
32. Côte d'Ivoire	26 June 1992	Overdue					
33. Croatia	8 October 1991	E/1990/5/Add.46. Received 4 July 2000					
34. Cyprus	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.21 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.17)	E/1980/6/Add.3 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.6)	E/1982/3/Add.19 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.7-8)	E/1984/7/Add.13 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.18 and 22)	E/1986/4/Add.2 and 26 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.2, 3 and 5)	

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
35. Czech Republic	1 January 1993	E/1990/5/Add.47. Received 30 August 2000					
36. Democratic People's Republic Of Korea	14 December 1981	E/1984/6/Add.7 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.21-22)	E/1986/3/Add.5 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.21-22)	E/1988/5/Add.6 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.6, 8 and 10)	Overdue		
37. Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 February 1977	E/1984/6/Add.18	E/1986/3/Add.7	E/1982/3/Add.41 (E/C.12/1988/SR.16-19)	Overdue		
38. Denmark	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.13 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1980/6/Add.15 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.12)	E/1982/3/Add.20 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.8-9)	E/1984/7/Add.11 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.17 and 21)	E/1986/4/Add.16 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.8-9)	
39. Dominica	17 September 1993	Overdue					
40. Dominican Republic	4 April 1978	E/1990/5/Add.4 (E/C.12/1990/SR.43-45 and 47)			E/1990/6/Add.7 (E/C.12/1996/SR.29 and 30) (E/C.12/1997/SR.29-31)		
41. Ecuador	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.1 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.4-5)	E/1986/3/Add.14	E/1988/5/Add.7 (E/C.12/1990/SR.37-39 and 42)	E/1984/7/Add.12 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.20 and 22)	Overdue	
42. Egypt	14 April 1982	E/1990/5/Add.38 (E/C.12/2000/SR.12, 13 and 14)					
43. El Salvador	29 February 1980	E/1990/5/Add.25 (E/C.12/1996/SR.15, 16 and 18)			Overdue		
44. Equatorial Guinea	25 December 1987	Overdue					
45. Eritrea	17 July 2001	Due on 30 June 2003					
46. Estonia	21 January 1992	E/1990/5/Add.51. Received 5 July 2001					
47. Ethiopia	11 September 1993	Overdue					
48. Finland	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.14 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.6)	E/1980/6/Add.11 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1982/3/Add.28 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.7-8)	E/1984/7/Add.14 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.17-18)	E/1986/4/Add.4 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.8-9 and 11)	E/1990/7/Add.1 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.11, 12 and 16)
49. France	4 February 1981	E/1984/6/Add.11 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.18-19 and 21)	E/1986/3/Add.10 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.12-13)	E/1982/3/Add.30 and Corr.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.5 and 7)	E/1990/6/Add.27. Received 30 June 2000		
50. Gabon	21 April 1983	Overdue					
51. Gambia	29 March 1979	Overdue					
52. Georgia	3 August 1994	E/1990/5/Add.37 (E/C.12/2000/SR.3, 4 and 5)			E/1990/6/Add.31. Received 19 June 2001		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
53. Germany	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.8 and Corr.1 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.8) E/1978/8/Add.11 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1980/6/Add.6 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.8) E/1980/6/Add.10 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.10)	E/1982/3/Add.15 and Corr.1 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.5-6) E/1982/3/Add.14 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.17-18)	E/1984/7/Add.3 and 23 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.12 and 16) E/1984/7/Add.24 and Corr.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.22-23 and 25)	E/1986/4/Add.11 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.11, 12 and 14) E/1986/4/Add.10 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.19-20)	E/1990/7/Add.12 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.35, 36 and 46)
54. Ghana	7 December 2000	Due on 30 June 2002					
55. Greece	16 August 1985	Overdue					
56. Grenada	6 December 1991	Overdue					
57. Guatemala	19 August 1988	E/1990/5/Add.24 (E/C.12/1996/SR.11-14)			Overdue		
58. Guinea	24 April 1978	Overdue					
59. Guinea-Bissau	2 October 1992	Overdue					
60. Guyana	15 May 1977	E/1990/5/Add.27 (Pending consideration)		E/1982/3/Add.5, 29 and 32 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.20 and 22 and E/1985/WG.1/ SR.6)			
61. Honduras	17 May 1981	E/1990/5/Add.40 (E/C.12/2001/SR.5-7; E/C.12/1/Add.57)			Due on 30 June 2006		
62. Hungary	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.7 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.7)	E/1980/6/Add.37 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.6-7 and 9)	E/1982/3/Add.10 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.14)	E/1984/7/Add.15 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.19 and 21)	E/1986/4/Add.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.6-7 and 9)	E/1990/7/Add.10 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.9, 12 and 21)
63. Iceland	22 November 1979	E/1990/5/Add.6 (E/C.12/1993/SR.29, 30, 31 and 46) E/1990/5/Add.14			E/1990/6/Add.15 (E/C.12/1999/SR.3-5)		
64. India	10 July 1979	E/1984/6/Add.13 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.20 and 24)	E/1980/6/Add.34 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.6 and 8)	E/1988/5/Add.5 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.16-17 and 19)	Overdue		
65. Iran (Islamic Republic of)	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.9 (E/C.12/1993/SR.7-9 and 20)		E/1982/3/Add.43 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.42, 43 and 45)	Overdue		
66. Iraq	3 January 1976	E/1984/6/Add.3 and 8 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.8 and 11)	E/1980/6/Add.14 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.12)	E/1982/3/Add.26 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.3-4)		E/1986/4/Add.3 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.8 and 11)	E/1990/7/Add.15 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.11 and 14)
67. Ireland	8 March 1990	E/1990/5/Add.34 (E/C.12/1999/SR.14-16)			E/1990/6/Add.29. Received 25 August 2000		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
68. Israel	3 January 1992	E/1990/5/Add.39 (E/C.12/1998/SR.31-33)			E/1990/6/Add.32. Received 3 August 2001		
69. Italy	15 December 1978	E/1978/8/Add.34 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.3-4)	E/1980/6/Add.31 and 36 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.3 and 5)		E/1990/6/Add.2 (E/C.12/1992/SR.13, 14 and 21)		
70. Jamaica	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.27 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.20)	E/1986/3/Add.12 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.10-12 and 15)	E/1988/5/Add.3 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.10-12 and15)	E/1984/7/Add.30 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.10-12 and 15)	E/1990/6/Add.28. Received 16 August 2000	
71. Japan	21 September 1979	E/1984/6/Add.6 and Corr.1 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1986/3/Add.4 and Corr.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.20-21 and 23)	E/1982/3/Add.7 (E/1982/WG.1 SR.12-13)	E/1990/6/Add.21 (E/C.12/2001/SR.42-43; E/C.12/1/Add.67)		
72. Jordan	3 January 1976	E/1984/6/Add.15 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.6-8)	E/1986/3/Add.6 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.8)	E/1982/3/Add.38/ Rev.1 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.30-32)	E/1990/6/Add.17 (E/C.12/2000/SR.30-31; E/C/12/1/Add.46)		
73. Kenya	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.18			Overdue		
74. Kuwait	31 August 1996	Overdue					
75. Kyrgyzstan	7 January 1995	E/1990/5/Add.42 (E/C.12/2000/SR.42-44; E/C.12/1/Add.49)					
76. Latvia	14 July 1992	Overdue			Overdue		
77. Lebanon	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.16 (E/C.12/1993/SR.14, 16 and 21)					
78. Lesotho	9 December 1992	Overdue					
79. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.26 (E/C.12/1997/SR.20-21)		E/1982/3/Add.6 and 25 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.16-17)	Overdue		
80. Liechtenstein	10 March 1999	Was due on 30 June 2001					
81. Lithuania	20 February 1992	Overdue					
82. Luxembourg	18 November 1983	E/1990/5/Add.1 (E/C.12/1990/SR.33-36)			E/1990/6/Add.9 (E/C.12/1997/SR.48 and 49)		
83. Madagascar	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.29 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.2)	E/1980/6/Add.39 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.2-3 and 5)	Overdue	E/1984/7/Add.19 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.14 and 18)	Overdue	
84. Malawi	22 March 1994	Overdue					
85. Mali	3 January 1976	Overdue					
86. Malta	13 December 1990	Overdue					
87. Mauritius	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.21 (E/C.12/1995/SR.40, 41 and 43)			Overdue		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
88. Mexico	23 June 1981	E/1984/6/Add.2 and 10 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.24, 26 and 28)	E/1986/3/Add.13 (E/C.12/1990 SR.6, 7 and 9)	E/1982/3/Add.8 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/6/Add.4 (E/C.12/1993/SR.32-35 and 49)		
89. Monaco	28 November 1997	Overdue					
90. Mongolia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.6 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.7)	E/1980/6/Add.7 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.8-9)	E/1982/3/Add.11 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.15-16)	E/1984/7/Add.6 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.16 and 18)	E/1986/4/Add.9 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.5 and 7)	
91. Morocco	3 August 1979	E/1990/5/Add.13 (E/C.12/1994/SR.8-10)			E/1990/6/Add.20 (E/C.12/2000/SR.70-72)		
92. Namibia	28 February 1995	Overdue					
93. Nepal	14 August 1991	E/1990/5/Add.45 (E/C.12/2001/SR.44-46, E/C.12/1/Add.66) Due 30 June 2006					
94. Netherlands	11 March 1979	E/1984/6/Add.14 and 20 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.5-6) (E/C.12/1989/ SR.14-15)	E/1980/6/Add.33 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.4-6 and 8)	E/1982/3/Add.35 and 44 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.14 and 18) (E/C.12/1989/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/6/Add.11 E/1990/6/Add.12 (E/C.12/1998/ SR.13-17)	E/1986/4/Add.24 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/6/Add.13 (E/C.12/1998/ SR.13-17)
95. New Zealand	28 March 1979	E/1990/5/Add.5, E/1990/5/Add.11 and E/1990/5/Add.12 (E/C.12/1993/SR.24, 25, 26 and 40)			E/1990/6/Add.33. Received 30 August 2001		
96. Nicaragua	12 June 1980	E/1984/6/Add.9 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.16-17 and 19)	E/1986/3/Add.15 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.27, 28 and 46)	E/1982/3/Add.31 and Corr.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.15)	Overdue		
97. Niger	7 June 1986	Overdue					
98. Nigeria	29 October 1993	E/1990/5/Add.31 (E/C.12/1998/SR.6-9)			Due on 30 June 2000		
99. Norway	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.12 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.5)	E/1980/6/Add.5 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.14)	E/1982/3/Add.12 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.16)	E/1984/7/Add.16 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.19 and 22)	E/1986/4/Add.21 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.14-15)	E/1990/7/Add.7 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.4, 5 and 12)
100. Panama	8 June 1977	E/1984/6/Add.19 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.3, 5 and 8)	E/1980/6/Add.20 and 23 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.5)	E/1988/5/Add.9 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.3, 5 and 8)	E/1990/6/Add.24 (Pending consideration)	E/1986/4/Add.22 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.3, 5 and 8)	E/1990/6/Add.24 (E/C.12/2001/ SR.36; E/C.12/1/Add.64)
101. Paraguay	10 September 1992	E/1990/5/Add.23 (E/C.12/1996/SR.1, 2 and 4)			Overdue		
102. Peru	28 July 1978	E/1984/6/Add.5 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.11 and 18)	E/1990/5/Add.29 (E/C.12/1997/SR.15-17)		Overdue		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
103. Philippines	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.4 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.11)	E/1986/3/Add.17 (E/C.12/1995/ SR.11, 12 and 14)	E/1988/5/Add.2 (E/C.12/1990/ SR.8-9 and 11)	E/1984/7/Add.4 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.15 and 20)	Overdue	
104. Poland	18 June 1977	E/1978/8/Add.23 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.18-19)	E/1980/6/Add.12 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.11)	E/1982/3/Add.21 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1984/7/Add.26 and 27 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.25-27)	E/1986/4/Add.12 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.5-6)	E/1990/7/Add.9 (E/C.12/1992/ SR.6, 7 and 15)
105. Portugal	31 October 1978		E/1980/6/Add.35/ Rev.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.2 and 4)	E/1982/3/Add.27/ Rev.1 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.6 and 9)	E/1990/6/Add.6 (E/C.12/1995/SR.7, 8 and 10) E/1990/6/Add.8 (Macau) (E/C.12/1996/SR.31-33)		
106. Republic of Korea	10 July 1990	E/1990/5/Add.19 (E/C.12/1995/SR.3, 4 and 6)			E/1990/6/Add.23 (E/C.12/1/Add.12-14; E/C.12/1/Add.59)		
107. Republic of Moldova	26 March 1993	E/1990/5/Add.52. Received 2 July 2001					
108. Romania	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.20 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.16-17)	E/1980/6/Add.1 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.5)	E/1982/3/Add.13 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.17-18)	E/1984/7/Add.17 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.10 and 13)	E/1986/4/Add.17 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.6)	E/1990/7/Add.14 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.5, 7 and 13)
109. Russian Federation	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.16 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.14)	E/1980/6/Add.17 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.14-15)	E/1982/3/Add.1 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.11-12)	E/1984/7/Add.7 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.9-10)	E/1986/4/Add.14 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.16-18)	E/1990/7/Add.8 (withdrawn)
110. Rwanda	3 January 1976	E/1984/6/Add.4 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.10 and 12)	E/1986/3/Add.1 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.16 and 19)	E/1982/3/Add.42 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.10-12)	E/1984/7/Add.29 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.10-12)	Overdue	
111. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	9 February 1982	Overdue					
112. San Marino	18 January 1986	Overdue					
113. Senegal	13 May 1978	E/1984/6/Add.22 (E/C.12/1993/ SR.37, 38 and 49)	E/1980/6/Add.13/ Rev.1 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.11)	E/1982/3/Add.17 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.14-16)	E/1990/6/Add.25 (E/C.12/2001/SR.32-33; E/C.12/1/Add.62)		
114. Seychelles	5 August 1982	Overdue					
115. Sierra Leone	23 November 1996	Overdue					
116. Slovakia	28 May 1993	E/1990/5/Add.49. Received 2 March 2001					
117. Slovenia	6 July 1992	Overdue					

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
118. Solomon Islands	17 March 1982	Overdue (without report: E/C.12/1999/SR.9, E/C.12/1/Add.33) E/1990/5/Add.50: Received 2 July 2001					
119. Somalia	24 April 1990	Overdue					
120. Spain	27 July 1977	E/1978/8/Add.26 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.20)	E/1980/6/Add.28 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.7)	E/1982/3/Add.22 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.10-11)	E/1984/7/Add.2 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.12 and 14)	E/1986/4/Add.6 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.10 and 13)	E/1990/7/Add.3 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.13, 14, 16 and 22)
121. Sri Lanka	11 September 1980	E/1990/5/Add.32 (E/C.12/1998/SR.3-5)					
122. Sudan	18 June 1986	E/1990/5/Add.41 (E/C.12/2000/SR.38-41; E/C.12/1/Add.48)			Due 30 June 2003		
123. Suriname	28 March 1977	E/1990/5/Add.20 (E/C.12/1995/SR.13, 15 and 16)			Overdue		
124. Sweden	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.5 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.15)	E/1980/6/Add.8 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.9)	E/1982/3/Add.2 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.19-20)	E/1984/7/Add.5 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.14 and 16)	E/1986/4/Add.13 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.10-11)	E/1990/7/Add.2 (E/C.12/1991/ SR.11-13 and 18)
125. Switzerland	18 September 1992	E/1990/5/Add.33 (E/C.12/1998/SR.37-39)			Overdue		
126. Syrian Arab Republic	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.25 and 31 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.2)	E/1980/6/Add.9 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.4)		E/1990/6/Add.1 (E/C.12/1991/SR.7, 9 and 11)		
127. Tajikistan	4 April 1999	Was due on 30 June 2001					
128. Thailand	5 December 1999	Due on 30 June 2002					
129. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	17 September 1991	Overdue					
130. Togo	24 August 1984	Overdue (without report: E/C.12/2001/SR.19; E/C.12/1/Add.61)					
131. Trinidad and Tobago	8 March 1979	E/1984/6/Add.21	E/1986/3/Add.11	E/1988/5/Add.1 (E/C.12/1989/SR.17-19)	E/1990/6/Add.30: Received 28 September 2000		
132. Tunisia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.3 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.5-6)	E/1986/3/Add.9 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.9)		E/1990/6/Add.14 (E/C.12/1999/SR.17-19)		
133. Turkmenistan	1 August 1997	Overdue					
134. Uganda	21 April 1987	Overdue					
135. Ukraine	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.22 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.18)	E/1980/6/Add.24 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.5-6)	E/1982/3/Add.4 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.11-12)	E/1984/7/Add.9 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.13-15)	E/1986/4/Add.5 (E/C.12/1987/ SR.9-11)	E/1990/7/Add.11 (withdrawn)

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Initial reports*			*Second periodic reports*		
		Articles 6-9	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*	*Articles 6-9*	*Articles 10-12*	*Articles 13-15*
		(Summary records of consideration of reports)					
136. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20 August 1976	E/1978/8/Add.9 and 30 (E/1980/WG.1/ SR.19 and E/1982/WG.1/ SR.1)	E/1980/6/Add.16 and Corr.1, Add.25 and Corr.1 and Add.26 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.16-17)	E/1982/3/Add.16 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.19-21)	E/1984/7/Add.20 (E/1985/WG.1/ SR.14 and 17)	E/1986/4/Add.23 (E/C.12/1989/ SR.16-17) E/1986/4/Add.27 E/1986/4/28 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.33-37)	E/1990/7/Add.16 (E/C.12/1994/ SR.33-37)
137. United Republic of Tanzania	11 September 1976	Overdue	E/1980/6/Add.2 (E/1981/WG.1/ SR.5)	Overdue			
138. Uruguay	3 January 1976	E/1990/5/Add.7 (E/C.12/1994/SR.3, 4, 6 and 13)			E/1990/6/Add.10 (E/C.12/1997/SR.42-44)		
139. Uzbekistan	28 December 1995	Overdue					
140. Venezuela	10 August 1978	E/1984/6/Add.1 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.7, 8 and 10)	E/1980/6/Add.38 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.2 and 5)	E/1982/3/Add.33 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.12, 17 and 18)	E/1990/6/Add.10 (E/C.12/2001/SR.3-5; E/C.12/1/Add.56)		
141. Viet Nam	24 December 1982	E/1990/5/Add.10 (E/C.12/1993/SR.9-11 and 19)			Overdue		
142. Yemen	9 May 1987	Overdue					
143. Yugoslavia	3 January 1976	E/1978/8/Add.35 (E/1982/WG.1/ SR.4 and 5)	E/1980/6/Add.30 (E/1983/WG.1/ SR.3)	E/1982/3/Add.39 (E/C.12/1988/ SR.14-15)	E/1984/7/Add.10 (E/1984/WG.1/ SR.16 and 18)	E/1990/6/Add.22 (Withdrawn)	
144. Zambia	10 July 1984	Overdue	E/1986/3/Add.2 (E/1986/WG.1/ SR.4, 5 and 7)	Overdue			
145. Zimbabwe	13 August 1991	E/1990/5/Add.28 (E/C.12/1997/SR.8-10 and 14)			Overdue		

Annex I *(continued)*

STATES PARTIES TO THE COVENANT AND STATUS OF SUBMISSION OF REPORTS

(as of 3 September 2001)

B. Third and fourth periodic reports

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
1. Afghanistan	24 April 1983		
2. Albania	4 January 1992		
3. Algeria	12 December 1989		
4. Angola	10 April 1992		
5. Argentina	8 November 1986		
6. Armenia	13 December 1993		
7. Australia	10 March 1976	E/1994/104/Add.22 (E/C.12/2000/SR.45-47, E/C.12/1/Add.50)	Due 30 June 2005
8. Austria	10 December 1978	Was due 30 June 1997	
9. Azerbaijan	13 November 1992		
10. Bangladesh	5 January 1999		
11. Barbados	3 January 1976		
12. Belarus	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.6 (E/C.12/1996/SR.34-36)	Was due 30 June 1999
13. Belgium	21 July 1983		
14. Benin	12 June 1992		
15. Bolivia	12 November 1982		
16. Bosnia and Herzegovina	6 March 1993		
17. Brazil	24 April 1992		
18. Bulgaria	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.16 (E/C.12/1999/SR.30-32)	Was due 30 June 2001
19. Burkina Faso	4 April 1999		
20. Burundi	9 August 1990		
21. Cambodia	26 August 1992		
22. Cameroon	27 September 1984		
23. Canada	19 August 1976	E/1994/104/Add.17 (E/C.12/1998/SR.46-48)	Was due 30 June 2000
24. Cape Verde	6 November 1993		
25. Central African Republic	8 August 1981		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
26. Chad	9 September 1995		
27. Chile	3 January 1976	Was due 30 June 1994	
28. China	27 June 2001		
29. Colombia	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.2 (E/C.12/1995/SR.32-35)	E/C.12/4/Add.5. Received 9 May 2000
30. Congo	5 January 1984		
31. Costa Rica	3 January 1976		
32. Côte d'Ivoire	26 June 1992		
33. Croatia	8 October 1991		
34. Cyprus	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.12 (E/C.12/1998/SR.34-36)	Was due 30 June 1999
35. Czech Republic	1 January 1993		
36. Democratic People's Republic of Korea	14 December 1981		
37. Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 February 1977		
38. Denmark*	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.15 (E/C.12/1999/SR.11-13)	Was due 30 June 1999
39. Dominica	17 September 1993		
40. Dominican Republic	4 April 1978	Was due 30 June 1999	
41. Ecuador	3 January 1976		
42. Egypt	14 April 1982		
43. El Salvador	29 February 1980		
44. Equatorial Guinea	25 December 1987		
45. Eritrea	17 July 2001		
46. Estonia	21 January 1992		
47. Ethiopia	11 September 1993		
48. Finland	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.7 (E/C.12/1996/SR.37-40)	E/C.12/4/Add.1 (E/C.12/2000/SR.61-63)
49. France	4 February 1981		
50. Gabon	21 April 1983		
51. Gambia	29 March 1979		
52. Georgia	3 August 1994		
53. Germany	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.14 (E/C.12/1998/SR.40-42)	E/C.12/4/Add.3 (E/C.12/2001/SR.48-49; E/C.12/1/Add.68) fifth periodic report due 30 June 2006
54. Ghana	7 December 2000		
55. Greece	16 August 1985		
56. Grenada	6 December 1991		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
57. Guatemala	19 August 1988		
58. Guinea	24 April 1978		
59. Guinea-Bissau	2 October 1992		
60. Guyana	15 May 1977		
61. Honduras	17 May 1981		
62. Hungary	3 January 1976	Was due 30 June 1994	
63. Iceland	22 November 1979		
64. India	10 July 1979		
65. Iran (Islamic Republic of)	3 January 1976		
66. Iraq	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.9 (E/C.12/1997/SR.33-35)	Was due 30 June 2000
67. Ireland	8 March 1990		
68. Israel	3 January 1992		
69. Italy	15 December 1978	E/1994/104/Add.19 (E/C.12/2000/SR.6, 7 and 8; E/C.12/1/Add.43)	
70. Jamaica	3 January 1976		
71. Japan	21 September 1979	Due 30 June 2006	
72. Jordan	3 January 1976	Due 30 June 2003	
73. Kenya	3 January 1976		
74. Kuwait	31 August 1996		
75. Kyrgyzstan	7 January 1995		
76. Latvia	14 July 1992		
77. Lebanon	3 January 1976		
78. Lesotho	9 December 1992		
79. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3 January 1976		
80. Liechtenstein	10 March 1999		
81. Lithuania	20 February 1992		
82. Luxembourg	18 November 1983	E/1994/104/Add.24. Received 23 July 2001	
83. Madagascar	3 January 1976		
84. Malawi	22 March 1994		
85. Mali	3 January 1976		
86. Malta	13 December 1990		
87. Mauritius	3 January 1976		
88. Mexico	23 June 1981	E/1994/104/Add.18 (E/C.12/1999/SR.44-46)	
89. Monaco	28 November 1997		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
90. Mongolia	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.21 (E/C.12/2000/SR.34-36, E/C.12/1/Add.47)	
91. Morocco	3 August 1979		
92. Namibia	28 February 1995		
93. Nepal	14 August 1991		
94. Netherlands	11 March 1979	Was due 30 June 1997	
95. New Zealand	28 March 1979		
96. Nicaragua	12 June 1980		
97. Niger	7 June 1986		
98. Nigeria	29 October 1993		
99. Norway	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.3 (E/C.12/1995/SR.34-37)	Was due 30 June 1999
100. Panama	8 June 1977	Due 30 June 2004	
101. Paraguay	10 September 1992		
102. Peru	28 July 1978		
103. Philippines	3 January 1976		
104. Poland	18 June 1977	E/1994/104/Add.13 (E/C.12/1998/SR.10-12)	Was due 30 June 1999
105. Portugal	31 October 1978	E/1994/104/Add.20 (E/C.12//2000/SR.58-60)	
106. Republic of Korea	10 July 1990	Due on 30 June 2006	
107. Republic of Moldova	26 March 1993		
108. Romania	3 January 1976	Was due 30 June 1994	
109. Russian Federation	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.8 (E/C.12/1997/SR.11-14)	Was due 30 June 1999
110. Rwanda	3 January 1976		
111. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	9 February 1982		
112. San Marino	18 January 1986		
113. Senegal	13 May 1978	Due 30 June 2003	
114. Seychelles	5 August 1982		
115. Sierra Leone	23 November 1996		
116. Slovakia	28 May 1993		
117. Slovenia	6 July 1992		
118. Solomon Islands	17 March 1982		
119. Somalia	24 April 1990		
120. Spain	27 July 1977	E/1994/104/Add.5 (E/C.12/1996/SR.3-7)	Was due 30 June 1999
121. Sri Lanka	11 September 1980		
122. Sudan	18 June 1986		

Annex I *(continued)*

State party	*Date of entry into force*	*Third periodic reports*	*Fourth periodic reports*
123. Suriname	28 March 1977		
124. Sweden	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.1 (E/C.12/1995/SR.13, 15 and 16)	E/C.12/4/Add.4. Received 10 April 2000
125. Switzerland	18 September 1992		
126. Syrian Arab Republic	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.23 (E/C.12/2001/SR.34-35; E/C.12/1/Add.63) due 30 June 2006	
127. Tajikistan	4 April 1999		
128. Thailand	5 December 1999		
129. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	17 September 1991		
130. Togo	24 August 1984		
131. Trinidad and Tobago	8 March 1979		
132. Tunisia	3 January 1976		
133. Turkmenistan	1 August 1997		
134. Uganda	21 April 1987		
135. Ukraine	3 January 1976	E/1994/104/Add.4 (E/C.12/1995/SR.42, 44 and 45)	E/C.12/4/Add.2 (E/C.12/2001/SR.40-41; E/C.12/1/Add.65), fifth periodic report due 30 June 2006
136. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20 August 1976	E/1994/104/Add.10 (Hong Kong) (E/C.12/1996/SR.39, 41, 42 and 44) E/1994/104/Add.11 (E/C.12/1997/SR.36-38) (E/1994/104/Add.24 (dependent territories) Received 13 April 2000)	E/C.12/4/Add.5 (overseas territories) Received 13 April 2000 E/C.12/4/Add.8. Received 30 January 2001
137. United Republic of Tanzania	11 September 1976		
138. Uruguay	3 January 1976		
139. Uzbekistan	28 December 1995		
140. Venezuela	10 August 1978	Due on 30 June 2006	
141. Viet Nam	24 December 1982		
142. Yemen	9 May 1987		
143. Yugoslavia	3 January 1976		
144. Zambia	10 July 1984		
145. Zimbabwe	13 August 1991		

* Fourth periodic report was due on 30 June 1999. At the request of the Government of Denmark, the Committee, at its twenty-first session (1999), decided to extend the deadline for the submission of the fourth periodic report to 30 June 2001.